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Summary findings
To understand the fiscal position of a country,  liability management, fiscal reserves, and risk mitigation.
contingent liabilities and other sources of fiscal risk need  Priorities for dealing with existing risks and limiting
to be considered. Brixi, Shatalov, and Zlaoui develop a  further accumulation of risks include:
framework to assess and manage fiscal risk in Bulgaria.  * Mitigating currency and interest rate risks in the
Bulgaria's Currency Board Arrangement has effectively  government liability structure.
imposed fiscal discipline, but leaves only limited room to  *  Implementing proposed institutional and finance
accommodate potential fiscal shocks. Through risks  reform of the country's pension and health care systems.
embedded in the portfolio of government contingent and  *  Building adequate contingency reserves.
direct liabilities, significant fiscal pressures could arise in  *  Introducing risk-sharing arrangements.
the future. Major sources of risk include environmental  *  Prioritizing and placing strict limits on the amounts
liabilities and investment requirements, collection  of new guaranteed obligations.
capacities of the social protection institutions, and  *  Developing government capacity to analyze and
further engagement in off-budget programs, such as  manage risks.
government guarantees.  *  Fully integrating fiscal risk management with other
To limit the government's  exposure to risks, yet  policy considerations in fiscal management, as part of an
accommodate investment needs crucial to growth and  integrated asset and liability management strategy.
development, Bulgaria must find an optimal strategy for
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International evidence has confirmed again and again that fiscal analysis is incomplete if
it skips over "hidden"  fiscal risks, such as obligations made by  the government outside the
budget.  First, as Kharas and Mishra (1999) explain, analyses of past increases in the stock of
government debt have shown that governments often accumulate debt as a  result of "hidden
deficits" rather than reported budget deficits.  Hidden deficits mainly arise from debt structure, as
currency, maturity or interest rate risks materialize, and from off-budget government obligations,
such as contingent liabilities that fall due.  Most recently,  some of the fiscal pressures that have
emerged from the East Asian crisis can be attributed to the fiscal risks due to the governments'
contingent liabilities (World Bank, 1999).
Second, any changes in the reported budget deficit are an illusion if they are accompanied
by offsetting changes in the value of public assets and in the country's  exposure to fiscal risks,
such as government contingent liabilities (Easterly, 1998).  Furthermore, as  Selowsky (1998)
emphasizes,  reported  deficit  improvements  do  not  necessarily  imply  "quality"  of  fiscal
adjustment, which has the dimension of sustainability as well as efficiency.  Narrow interests in
reducing budget deficit may actually increase rather than reduce government exposure to fiscal
risks, and deteriorate rather than improve the prospects of future fiscal performance.
Third, the conventional approach to the analysis of deficit sustainability is limited in two
ways: it looks only at the liability side of the public sector balance sheet and it considers only
direct liabilities, ignoring contingent liabilities, both explicit and implicit.'  In this context, fiscal
vulnerability is defined by Hemming (1999) as a situation where the government is exposed to
the possibility of failure to achieve its broad fiscal policy objectives. It is concerned in particular
with the emergence of unexpected fiscal risks and policy challenges and with the government's
capacity to respond to them.  Fiscal vulnerability takes into account: (a) the initial fiscal position
(including the central government budget, other levels of government, extrabudgetary funds and
quasi-fiscal activities, assets and liabilities, contingent liabilities, fiscal indicators), (b) sensitivity
of the fiscal position to  short-term risks, such as macroeconomic volatility, called contingent
liabilities, and unclear expenditure commitments, (c) medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability
(debt  dynamics,  baseline  projection  and  stress  testing,  and  long-term  pressures  from
demographic trends,  resource depletion, etc.), and  (d) strucutural or  institutional weaknesses
(expenditure composition, revenue system, deficit financing, government access to debt markets,
institutional capacity for fiscal management).
Under the conventional  approach,  the actual deficit is compared  with the estimated  sustainable  deficit level
that will keep the debt to GDP ratio constant  for feasible rates of growth,  real interest, and inflation. This
approach assumes that keeping a constant ratio of public debt to GDP will ensure public sector solvency and
avoid  debt  crises  in the  future.  Another,  less  stringent requirement  is to  test  for the  no-Ponzi  scheme
condition for public debt, followed up by the neoclassical solvency approach.  This methodology checks for
public solvency by comparing the ratio of public debt to GDP with the real interest rate.  If the  debt ratio
systematically  grows  faster  than  the  real  interest  rate,  the  public  sector  is  considered  insolvent.  For
background on fiscal sustainability analysis, see Anand (1988, 1989, and 1990).
3Analysis of  fiscal risks becomes  increasingly important.  Reasons  include  increasing
volumes and volatility of private capital flows, transformation of the state from financing  of
services to guaranteeing particular outcomes, and related to both of these, moral hazards in the
markets, and fiscal opportunism of policy makers.  Fiscal risks become particularly threatening
in countries with a limited scope for maneuver in government financing.  Limited access to debt
market and constraints on the use of monetary policy instruments reduce the amount of fiscal
risks that governments "safely" take on.
Bulgaria's  ability to absorb fiscal risks is limited.  Currency board arrangement, limited
access to debt markets, already high levels of tax revenues, and a large share of nondiscretionary
expenditures severely constrain the scope for government maneuver in cases when fiscal risks
materialize.  The country is recovering from years of macroeconomic instability, high inflation
and currency crisis. Its economy is still fragile and realization of fiscal risks thus may have very
serious  consequences for the  country's  economic and  social development  as  well  as  fiscal
performance. The objective of accession to the European Union also demands the government to
maintain all fiscal risks under a very tight control while accommodating substantial infrastructure
and environmental investment to achieve high growth and/or meet accession requirements. With
already high level of indebtedness, Bulgaria faces a difficult trade-off. Should Bulgaria adopt a
very conservative stance towards debt and fiscal risk at the expense of investment and growth or
rather accept a slower pace of dis-indebtedness and guarantee the resources needed for economic
restructuring and mitigation of the impact on the poor and vulnerable? So far, Bulgaria has been
successful in reducing its debt burden while relying on high levels of fiscal reserves as a main
contingency instrument. Its future investment and developmental agenda, however,  call for a
better mix of fiscal reserve, debt management and risk mitigation strategies.
The objective of this paper is to present a systematic analysis of fiscal risks in Bulgaria
and advise on risk monitoring, assessment, management and mitigation strategies.  The paper is
divided into four sections.  After this introduction we present a simple framework, the Fiscal
Risk Matrix, to identify and classify Bulgaria's fiscal risks. We set our analysis of fiscal risks in
a broader macroeconomic and institutional background, leaning toward assessment of Bulgaria's
overall risk exposure and fiscal vulnerability.  Section II offers analysis of the individual sources
of fiscal risk in Bulgaria.  We analyze the size, probability and sensitivity of risks arising from
direct and contingent, both explicit and implicit government liabilities.  Section III outlines our
recommendations for Bulgaria  to  strengthen its  fiscal risk  management framework and  debt
management policy.  We offer a set of immediate and medium-term measures to contain some of
the main sources of fiscal risk.  Furthermore, building on country experience with medium-term
expenditure framework (Campos and Pradhan, 1996), we develop a broader medium-term fiscal
framework,  as  an  institutional  arrangement  for  country  fiscal  management.  Finally,  we
summarize our findings in section IV.
4I. Is Bulgaria  Exposed  to Fiscal Risks?
1. Bulgaria's  Fiscal  Risk Matrix
As in Polackova  (1998) we focus on fiscal risks emerging  from government  obligations
of four  types: direct  explicit,  direct  implicit,  contingent  explicit  and contingent  implicit  (table 1).
Government  direct explicit  liabilities  are specific  obligations  that will fall due with certainty  and
are defined  by law or contract. They  are the subject  of traditional  fiscal analysis  and, in Bulgaria,
particularly  include sovereign  debt service  and, in the long term, legally  mandated  pension  and
health expenditures.  Government direct implicit liabilities represent a moral obligation or
political,  rather than legal,  burden on the government  that will occur with certainty. They often
arise as a presumed  consequence  of public expenditure  policies  in the longer term. In Bulgaria,
the largest are accumulated  and expected  public investment  needs to deliver anticipated  public
services and meet key requirements  for accession  to the European Union. Explicit contingent
liabilities  represent  government's  legal obligations  to make a payment  only if a particular  event
occurs.  In Bulgaria, state guarantees for nonsovereign  borrowing and obligations for past
environment  damages  are the main examples of this type of government  obligation. Implicit
contingent liabilities are those that are not officially  recognized until a failure occurs.  The
triggering  event,  the value at risk, and the required  size of the government  outlay  are uncertain.
5Table 1  Bulgaria's Fiscal Risk Matrix
Sources of  Direct  (obligation in any event)  Contingent (obligation  f a particular event occurs)
fiscal risk
Explicit  *  Foreign and domestic  *  Individual state guarantees for nonsovereign
sovereign debt (size and  borrowing and obligations
obligation  Is  structure)  *  Obligation to recover past environment
recognized  by  *  Future pension  damages assumed in enterprise privatization
law  or contract  expenditures required by  and other environment liabilities
law  *  Obligations of business promotion bank
a  Health expenditures  *  Obligations of export insurance agency
required by law  (insurance policies to cover political and
medium-term  commercial  risks)
*  Obligations of state fund for agriculture
Implicit  *  Accumulated and  *  Environment commitments for still
A "moral"  expected  public  unknown  damages  and nuclear  and toxic
obligation  of  investment needs to  waste
the  government  sustain delivery of public  *  Clean up of enterprise arrears and liabilities
that  mainly  services and meet key
reflects  public  requirements for  *  Default  of municipalities  on own non-
expectations  a  guaranteed debt, own guarantees, and/or
and  pressures  accession to the EU  own obligations to provide critical public
by interest  *  Future recurrent costs of  services
groups  public investment
projecs  a*  Support to the banking sector in case of
prOJectS  crisis
Obligations listed above refer to the fiscal authorities, not the central bank.
Government exposure to risks is not negligible
Bulgaria's future fiscal position may suffer from short-term shocks arising from
fiscal risks identified in the Fiscal Risk Matrix.  Structure and size of Bulgaria's sovereign debt
are somewhat worrisome. Even after the 1992-94 successful restructuring, Bulgaria remains one
of the most heavily indebted countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  High debt levels remain a
significant source of fiscal vulnerability, threatening the country creditworthiness, and impeding
Bulgaria's  access to international  financial  markets.
Of the 83 percent of GDP of public debt, about 90 percent is foreign, nearly a half in
Brady  bonds  and  the  rest  mostly  owed  to  international  financial  institutions.  Most  debt
instruments are long-term, with  a floating interest rate, and  denominated in US  dollars. The
external debt service ratio is projected to remain within a manageable, but rather high range of
20-22  percent  of  exports  of  goods and  services 2. The debt  structure  is  rigid  and  implies
2  Traditionally, a debt service ratio of 25 percent or higher is considered to be a fairly reliable predictor of debt
crisis. Bulgaria's debt service ratio is below this crisis warning threshold, but is still rather high; further
6significant refinancing risk.  Bulgaria has not regained reliable capital market access and faces
volatility  of  investors'  preference.  Integrated asset  and  liability  framework  indicates that
currency risk is on average naturally hedged by dollar-denominated exports but is significant
with regards to short-term exchange rate movements.  Interest rate risk is also substantial.  One
percentage point rise in the international interest rates (Libor) would translate into an additional
70-80 million US  dollars in annual debt service over 2000-2004.  Stress-testing interest rate
indicates that a 3 percentage points rise in Libor would bring Bulgaria's debt service ratio above
25 percent of exports - a level that often serves as a crisis warning indicator.
Other  risks to  fiscal  stability  in  Bulgaria  are  mainly  associated  with  the  remaining
transition  process  and  with  the  cost  of  economic and  social restructuring.  Potential  fiscal
pressure may particularly arise from the financial and environmental liabilities of state-owned
enterprises that  the  government  may  have  to  assume  during  restructuring,  privatization or
liquidation of enterprises. Part of these liabilities have already been made explicit, others are still
unknown.
Environment, together with the country's  infrastructure network and energy sector, also
stands for a large amount of investments required in the context of Bulgaria's  accession to the
European Union.  Overall  environmental  expenditures are  expected to  reach  about US$8.5
billion, that is 69 percent of 1999 GDP, by 2015, implying an approximate US$0.5 billion per
year in  annual public  investment expenditure. The Bulgarian  government public  investment
program for 2000-2006 envisages an  annual disbursement of US$ 400  (3 percent of GDP in
2000) million for environmental projects. With public investment projected at about 3.5 percent
of  GDP in 2000 and the years ahead, the need for investment in  infrastructure, institutional
capacity and social welfare is likely to result in significant fiscal pressures. Hence, Bulgaria's
development and progress toward the EU accession will rely on the availability of concessional
financing and on private sector participation.  Private sector participation as well as loans from
Internal Financial Institutions may demand government guarantees.  Refraining from providing
guarantees would  entail  developmental costs.  On the  other hand,  generous  and  imprudent
guarantee  policy  would  generate  moral  hazard  in  the  markets  and  fiscal  threats  to  the
government.
In the medium term, the government faces a trend of  increasing pension  and  health
spending, possibly averted by the proposed reforms.  Both pension and health reforms, however,
may generate significant transition cost.  With reform, the government is likely to face around  2
percent of GDP of increased deficits on its pension account by 2001.  Without reform, pension
deficits  are projected up to  2.7 percent  of GDP.  Total health  expenditures  are expected to
increase from 4 to above 6 percent of GDP during 1999-2001. With reform, a newly established
Health  Insurance  Fund  is  expected  to  mobilize  about  1.5  percent  of  GDP  directly  from
individuals  and  employers  (offset by  a  reduction  in  funds collected by  the  National  Social
Security Institute).  These reforms, however, will  alleviate the state budget only  after better
sections of this paper suggest that adverse developments could hike the debt service ratio above the 25 percent
warning threshold.
7institutional capacities to collect pension and health contributions are in place. Currently several
institutions are involved in the collection of taxes and social contributions and the government
wants to  establish by mid-2000 a  single revenue collection agency centralizing collection and
control functions.
As for contingent liabilities, unlike in most other EU accession countries Bulgaria's  risk
exposure is relatively modest, though not unsubstantial.  The government has applied prudent
limits  and regulations for  state guarantees.  Presently, the government  reports  the stock  of
guarantees of about 17 percent of GDP.  Of these obligations, 9 percent of GDP is de facto direct
debt  owed to  the IMF.  Government  obligation for almost  4 percent  of  GDP  of  domestic
guaranteed debt expires in April  2000.  Calls on the remaining guarantees,  which  currently
amount to about 4 percent of GDP, however, could cause uncomfortable fiscal losses during
2000-2004.  In addition, for private sector development purposes, the government guarantees
obligations of agencies, like the State Fund for Agriculture, the Export Insurance Agency, and
the Business Promotion Bank.  These are small so far.  As Bulgaria's creditworthiness remains
weak, also the country's private non-guaranteed debt is very low.
Pressure on the government to provide guarantees and other iforms  of off-budget support,
through  the various  existing and  new  state-guaranteed agencies, is  likely  to  increase  as the
economy recovers, private investors substitute for public investment in agriculture, commercial
banks  continue  to  abstain  from  providing  long-term  credit,  and  foreign  creditors  fear  of
uncertainties.
In the financial sector, the 1996-97 hyperinflation, crisis, and subsequent policy actions
by the Bulgarian National Bank have effectively cleaned up the banking sector.  The ensuing
reform  has  successfully capped  both  explicit  and  implicit  goveinment  obligations  for  lost
deposits and failed banks.  Since then, an improved supervision has controlled exposure of banks
to liquidity and interest rate risks.  The quality of bank's  loan portfolio and foreign exchange
exposure cause concern but not a significant fiscal risk so far.
Government institutional arrangements for managing  fiscal risks are  strong in  many
aspects but not totally reassuring.  Parliamentary scrutiny over contingent liabilities and public
disclosure of their aggregate levels is good.  Future fiscal pressures may, however, arise from
legal loopholes or from the government practice to cover all risks under every guarantee, which
insures  both  creditors and  debtors  against their  possible  failures.  Finally,  the  government
capacity to  analyze, mitigate  and  manage  risk  needs  to  be  enhanced.  The  government  is
presently  not  fully  aware about  the  size and  urgency of  its  risk  exposure.  And,  without
implementing  new  approaches,  such  as  public-private  risk  sharing  mechanisms,  contingent
liabilities may have negative consequences for the markets as well as for future government
budgets.
82. Why Fiscal Vulnerability
What will be the government's capacity to respond to the realization of fiscal risks in the
future? Building on Hemming (1999), in this section we briefly sketch Bulgaria's fiscal position,
its sensitivity to risks, and sources of risks.
Current fiscal position appears good
Bulgaria's  current fiscal position has been held in check following the introduction of a
currency board  arrangement in  19973. General government budget  deficit dropped  from  12
percent of GDP in 1996 to 2.5 percent in 1997.  In 1998, the budget registered a surplus of 0.9
percent of GDP and in 1999, despite the slow-down of growth due to the Kosovo crisis, deficit is
expected to stay below 1.5 percent of GDP.
Recent revenue performance has been strong and resilient to the economic shocks that
have marked the 1998-99 period (the Russian and Kosovo crises).  General government revenues
increased from 31.7 percent of GDP in 1997 to 36.8 percent of GDP in 1998 and an estimated 38
percent of GDP in 1999.  General government expenditures, however, are also on the rise.  For
1999, they are projected to reach 39.5 percent of GDP, up from 35.8 percent in 1998, recovering
from their  collapse during the  1996-97 crisis.  Leading this  trend, social  expenditures have
increased by 1.8 percentage point, while wages and contingency to pay for the cost of structural
reforms by 0.8 and 0.7 percentage points, respectively.
Beyond general government budgets, Bulgaria's fiscal position does not suffer from any
imminent major  pressures either.  The Currency Board  Arrangement  (CBA) 4 precludes the
National  Bank from engaging in quasi-fiscal activities.  The number of extrabudgetary funds
declined from over 1000 in 1998 to 28 in 1999. We limit our analysis here to the largest ones, the
Pension Fund, Health Fund and Agricultural Fund. Though these funds are rife with fiscal risks,
which we will discuss in the following section, their positions appear balanced so far.
3  Annex I  presents Bulgaria's  fiscal framework for  1997-2002, including the main revenue and expenditure
itemis  as well as the projected  deficit  and its financing.
4  Introduced  after  a spell  of large deficits  and hyperinflation  in July 1997,  the currency  board arrangement  came
as a response  to several  unsuccessful  money-based  stabilization  attempts  and to widespread  lack of financial
discipline  of large state-owned  enterprises  and financial  institutions  as well as budgetary  agencies. CBA  was
meant to stop a vicious  circle of government  subsidies  and soft commercial  bank financing,  that have kept
loss-making  enterprises  afloat.  The arrangement  has fixed  the domestic  currency, lev (BGL),  to the German
mark, and prescribed  full coverage  of the monetary  base  with foreign  reserves. Furthermore,  it cut off central
bank credit to both the government and the banking sector.  Since January 1, 1999, the lev is fixed to the Euro
at the same rate as the DM peg to the Euro. In addition, the original rate BGLIOOO/DM  was changed on July 5,
1999 when three zeros were removed, the denomination became BGN, and the  peg  IBGN per IDM.  Under
the June 1997 law, the Bulgarian National Bank is not allowed to extend credit to the State or any state agency
except against purchase of  special drawing rights from  the  IMF.  Similarly, the  Bulgarian National Bank
(BNB) is forbidden to extend credit to banks, except under very strict conditions in its narrowly defined role of
lender of last resort.
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framework presented in  Annex  1 as  well  as  debt dynamics, which  we  will  illustrate later,
suggests relatively stable baseline.  Main fiscal pressures come from debt service payments and
transitional costs associated with the implementation of the health and pension reforms.  In the
baseline,  debt service payments will remain  substantial at about 20-22 percent of exports of
goods and services, growing to about US$1.4 billion per annum by 2004.  The pension deficit
and health expenditures increase by 2 and  I percent of GDP, respectively, between  1999 and
2001.
The  government has  committed  to  a  fiscally  responsible behavior.  Under  its  IMF
supported program and with EU accession objective, the government intends not to run deficits
in excess of 3 percent of GDP and in the medium term reduce its debt to GDP ratio below 60
percent (thus comply with the Maastricht deficit and debt criteria).  Furthermore, the government
aims at keeping the debt service below 25 percent of exports and 30 percent of fiscal revenues, at
pursuing market risk benchmarks in its debt portfolio, and at cushioning possible future shocks
with large reserves.
In line with the requirements of a currency board arrangement, Bulgaria has maintained
comfortable levels of both external (central bank) and fiscal reserves.  External reserves have
exceeded the equivalent of six months of imports of goods and non-factor services.  On its Fiscal
Reserves Account (FRA), which consists of the balances of all government budgetary and extra-
budgetary accounts in the banking sector, the government maintains certain floor throughout the
fiscal year.  This  floor which  exceeded 8 percent of  GDP  at the  end  of  1998 is the  main
contingency instrument to address selected fiscal risks. The floor on the FRA can be adjusted to
accommodate larger than expected structural reform-related contingent expenditures, higher than
projected interest payments or shortfall of official financing relative to  program projections'.
Large reserves impose, however, opportunity cost of investment and growth.  As we will discuss
further, only major improvements in risk mitigation and risk management capacity would reduce
the reserve requirement, opening a way toward a better mix of reserve and hedging strategy and
releasing resources for investment.
Room to accommodate fiscal  risk is, however, limited
A combination of factors explains why Bulgaria's fiscal position is less resilient to fiscal
risks than it appears from the analysis of the current fiscal position.  First, while the CBA is very
effective in achieving fiscal stability, it does by definition reduce the range of options otherwise
available for deficit financing, and therefore the scope for fiscal expansion or for accommodating
sudden expenditure hikes due to the materialization of unaccounted for fiscal risks.  Out of the
four possibilities that  are available to  most  countries in  financing their  public  sector deficit
(printing  money,  running  down  foreign  reserves,  and  foreign  and  domestic  government
borrowing), the CBA rules out the former two.  Foreign and domestic borrowing, along with
5  In addition, the government  allocates  resources  within the budget for contingent  expenditures. Around I
percent of GDP in 1999  and 1.2  percent of GDP in 2000 were allocated  for possible  calls on guarantees  and
implementation  problems  of pension  and health  reforms.
10exceptional  proceeds such as  privatization revenues, thus remain  the  only  means of  deficit
financing and of raising money to face sudden shocks.
Following the CBA adoption,  t  Chart  1: General  Government  Overall  Balance
the main source of deficit financing  and its  Financing
shifted  from  the  domestic  banking;
system  (on  a  net  basis)  to  15
privatization revenues (chart 1). High  10 I
negative  net  domestic  financing  in  :  5
1998-99 reflects the amortization of  0  o
past  bonds.  Net  external financing  5
also shows a negative transfer of 1.3
percent of GDP in 1997 declining to  *15
0.7  percent  in  1999.  In  1998, the  -1  1
overall balance registered a  surplus  - 96__1997  1998  1999 euverallbaeant  e  to0.9perent  of  Grpls  Overall  balance u  Net Extemal  Net Domestic  . Privatization
equivalent  to  0.9  percent  of  GDP.l 
Privatization receipts  contributed to
68 percent of the overall financing while net domestic and external financing were negative.  A
deficit of 1.5 percent of GDP is projected for 1999 while privatization receipts are expected to
approximate  2.6  percent  of  GDP,  comfortably  covering  the  financing  needs.  Privatization
receipts cannot be used for current budgetary expenditures. They enter the fiscal reserve account
and can be used for debt repayments and investment financing. The privatization receipts of the
municipalities can be used for ecological projects, investment debt repayments  or writing off
non-performing loans of municipality-owned enterprises.
As the privatization process comes close to an end, revenues from the sale of state-owned
enterprises will fall down.  The largest and most profitable state-owned enterprises have already
been  or  are now being  privatized.  Further  sizeable revenues  could  be  expected from the
privatization of BTC (Bulgaria telecommunications company), Bulgartabac (tobacco company),
Bulbank (the largest state-owned bank) and several power distribution companies in 2000-01,
after which the scope for raising substantial revenues from privatization shrinks. This may raise
questions about the availability of resources for debt payment and investment financing.
Second, in responding to shocks, the government faces a constraint on both the revenue
and expenditure side.  With revenues at about 38 percent of GDP in  1999 and a bias toward
payroll tax, further increase in tax rates would damage investment and growth.  Actually, the
main fiscal policy objective is to broaden the tax base and strengthen collection in order to lower
tax rates on labor and income.
Social  security  contributions  rates  have  remained  high  at  (depending  on  workers
categories), 49.7, 44.7 and 34.7 percent of gross wages, paid by the employers, with additional 1
percent (deductible from the personal income tax) paid by employees.  The combined corporate
tax rate arising from profit tax and municipal tax is 34.5 percent (a reduced 26-percent rate
applies  to  small  enterprises).  The  value  added  tax  rate  is  20  percent.  Social insurance
contributions generate about 8.5 percent  of GDP, similarly as the value-added tax.  Non-tax-
11revenues, such as municipal fees, various levies, and income from rented properties generate
additional 6 percent of GDP.  Reflecting trade liberalization, excise and custom duties account
for less than 5 percent of GDP.  Positive institutional developments, such as improvement in tax
administration have contributed to stronger revenue performance in most areas.
The structure of governnent  expenditure is rigid. At around 39 percent of GDP in 1999,
government expenditures are dominated by social protection programs, debt service, and wages.
Pensions and other social outlays account for 13 percent of GDP ancl wages for over 5 percent of
GDP.  Interest payments now exceed 5 percent of GDP.  Necessary maintenance and operating
expenditure are projected at around 5 percent of GDP.  This comes up to  about 30 percent of
GDP, leaving about 7 percent of GDP in total for defense and capital expenditure in 1999.
Experience of the last years has shown that in case of emergency the government avails
of instruments for a temporary reduction of spending. The annual budget law provisions impose
consistency between spending and revenue flows-- in the course of the year only  90 percent
disbursement on expenses is allowed, only if revenues perform as expected, is spending allowed
to increase up to  100 percent of the Budget Law. The law also explicitly states the priorities in
case of lower than expected revenue flows. While these provisions appear effective to  reach
deficit targets, expenditure cuts, as a possible response to  shocks, or to accommodate higher
investment levels will be difficult to make without a thorough and detailed analysis to prioritize
expenditure and identify efficiency gains.
II. Analysis of Individual Sources of Risk
This section evaluates fiscal risks that emerge in the form of direct and contingent, both
explicit and implicit liabilities of the central government.  In this context, we define risk broadly,
as  elements involving uncertain fiscal cost  (hence contingent liabilities for  instance)  and as
variability in the effective cost of government obligations and in the associated financial flows.
1. Direct explicit Risk
Sovereign debt poses medium-term  fiscal risk
Trends  in  government  debt  appear  reassuring.
Until recently, Bulgaria's goverrnent  debt was a major  Chart 2  Sovereign  debt
obstacle to  growth and  investment.  External debt  - 1  lcentofGDP)
exceeded US$10 billion, or 57 percent of GDP, in 1990.  160  -
As the cost of debt service had risen above Bulgaria's  14=
perceived capacity to pay, the government announced a  100
unilateral moratorium on debt service payments.  In the  so
following years, output collapsed, and sovereign debt to  60
GDP skyrocketed to 150 percent of GDP.  Restructuring  0
of debt to the Paris Club in  1992 and London Club in  E
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GDP.  Domestic debt, however, had been rising swiftly, as the government borrowed to prepare
12state-owned enterprises for privatization, and to bail out failing banks.  Bulgaria was unable to
access international capital markets, and its official lending has been limited ever since.  Striving
to return its debt below the Maastricht threshold of 60 percent of GDP, the government generated
sizeable primary surpluses of 6.4 percent of GDP annually over 1994-1999, reducing its debt to
82 percent of GDP in 1998 (chart 2).  This level on gross basis, as well as 59 percent of GDP on
net basis is still among the highest of the EU accession countries.
As Bulgaria had to regularize its relations with its external creditors, it had to cope with a
negative transfer of resources, that averaged 5 percent of GDP during 1994-1998.  Meanwhile,
the budget deficit was financed from domestic sources.  Domestic deficit financing averaged 6.7
percent of GDP annually during 1994-1995, peaking at 14.9 percent of GDP in 1996.  Investors'
confidence eroded quickly, and average maturity of the of Treasury bills collapsed from ten
months to mere two weeks at the peak of the crisis.
Introduction  of  the  CBA  brought
confidence  back.  The  burden  of  interest  Chart  3. Projected  external  debt  service
payments eased to around 5 percent of GDP, but  US$ million
foreign  debt  service  is  projected  to  remain  1500
substantial 6. In absolute terms it is expected to
exceed  US$1  billion  in  2001  and  stabilize  at  1000
about 21-22% of exports of goods and services  principal
(Chart 3).  This level is uncomfortably close to  500
the empirical crisis threshold of 25 percent and  interest
will continue to  constrain Bulgaria's  flexibility  0  I  I
in  the use  of  debt financing to  dampen fiscal  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004
shocks.
Since the introduction of the CBA, the government has been cautious in  its borrowing
policies.  It prudently refused repeated offers from the commercial creditors in the Eurobond
market in 1998. Aftershocks of the Russian and Kosovo crises that have shifted the yield curve
substantially upwards in 1999 prove that this prudent stance was well grounded.  Net financing
from the domestic market has been negative since mid-1998, while the external debt has been
reduced by two successful debt buyback operations in 1998-99 at deep discounts.  The total face
value of debt eliminated via buybacks is estimated at well over US$1  billion.  Bulgaria was
rewarded for its responsible borrowing strategy by a 1999 rating upgrade (to B+) and by a steady
increase in the average maturity of the Treasury bills from 13 to 21 months as of end- 1999.
Debt structure has stabilized but remains rigid.  The share of foreign debt dropped briefly
after the Paris and London  Club restructuring deals.  Rapid erosion of the value of domestic
currency  during  1995-1997, however, wiped  out the  lev-denominated debt  and brought  the
external debt burden back to  unsustainable level of 90 percent of GDP.  The  1998 share of
domestic debt was 17 percent of the total public debt, with about two thirds (mainly associated
6  Projections  include  new identified  borrowing  and gapfill  financing.  Source:  IMF staff  estimates.
13with the realization of past contingent government liabilities) denominated in the US dollar.  The
remaining one third of the domestic debt is in Treasury bills (Chart 4).  The share of foreign and
domestic debt denominated in US dollar is about two thirds of the total debt in  1999.  Brady
--  of  bonds  dominate  the  foreign  debt  portfolio
Chart  4 Structure  of Sovereign  Debt  followed by  debt  owed  to  international
Other  private (1998)  financial institutions.  Most debt instruments
External 
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7l  18%  management  seeks  to  handle  in  a
- _  _  - T  comprehensive fashion all three main forms
of market risk facing government: (a) refinancing risk, (b) interest rate risk,  and (c) foreign
exchange risk. In a financial portfolio approach we compare the risk structures of financial flows
and the stocks of financial assets and liabilities on the two sides of the government balance sheet.
7  We define our approach rather narrowly, focusing on government direct debt portfolio and
central bank reserves.  We do so because the direct debt portfolio is very large compared to
contingent liabilities, and central bank and fiscal reserves are large compared to other financial,
existing and potential, assets.  In addition, we take into account the lev's  peg and the country's
trade flows since these drive Bulgaria's capital account developments.
We consider refinancing risk first.  Refinancing risk can be defined as the volatility of a
sovereign's access to liquidity and to sources of debt financing over a longer-term period. As the
1997-98 emerging-market crisis illustrated, Bulgaria  again may  face prohibitively expensive
market access in the future.  Moreover, Bulgaria's ability to refinance domestic debt is also very
limited, since the domestic capital market remains rather shallow.
In this  context, we evaluate refinancing risk by  the overall  maturity of sovereign debt
portfolio and by  the volatility  of its repayment profile. Maturity structure  seems reassuring.
Brady  bonds  and  debt  to  international  financial  institutions  mature  in  16.5 and  10 years,
respectively,  bringing  thus  average  foreign  debt  maturity to  above  13 years.  The  dollar
denominated domestic debt is also long-term.  Maturity of the outstanding Treasury bills has
reached 21 months by end- 1999.  However, this maturity structure is rigid.  Neither restructured
7  This approach skips over possible valuation changes driven by  the exchange rate movements in  the
government's  real assets  and liabilities.  Afull balance  sheet  approach,  incorporating  real assets  and liabilities,
is methodologically  more attractive,  but more difficult to implement. First, there usually exists a large
maturity mismatch between the  asset and  the  liability  sides, since government's  real  assets are  normally
longer-term  than its financial  liabilities.  Second,  the usefulness  of financial  instruments  to hedge  currency  risk
in the government's  real assets and liabilities  is limited  since markets  to hedge long-term  risks are not well
developed.
14London Club debt nor the debt to international financial institutions can be rolled over.  Net
Treasury  bill  financing  has  been  negative  since  mid-1998,  issuance  small,  and  auction
placements  consistently  below  offer  volumes.  In  addition,  as  we  will  discuss  further,  a
significant amount of Bulgaria's  governmnent  debt has a floating interest rate and thus makes the
repayment profile volatile.  Refinancing risks will increase as debt service rises in the medium
term.
Evaluation of the currency risk is simplified under the CBA.  The CBA credibility appears
strong.  Thus  we  treat  the  Euro-denominated  debt  not  much different  from  domestic  debt.
Bulgaria's cross-currency risk boils down to the US dollar/Euro risk, as the share of other foreign
currencies is modest, both for the assets and liabilities.  Bulgaria's  natural hedges to currency
risk in its government debt portfolio include foreign exchange reserves, mainly denominated in
the Euro, and current account cash flows, essentially net exports of goods and services, mainly
denominated in US dollars, with a deficit emerging in the Euro-denominated trade.
With respect to foreign exchange reserves, we observe a large mismatch between the bias
toward the Euro in their structure and the bias toward the US dollar in the structure of Bulgaria's
sovereign  debt.  In  stylized  terms,  we  present  a  simple  combined  balance  sheet  of  the
government and the central bank in table 2.
Table 2  Simplified balance sheet  as of  12/31/ 98
(bill BGL)  BNB (issue dep)  MOF  Net exposure
l  ~~~BGq  USC  EUH  BGq  USO  EU  _BGq  US5[  EUF
Currency  reserves  259  416  0  258  416,
Gov. Account  -65f  -258  -103  651  258  103  0  0  l
Gov debt  _  _  __  __  -10709  -1761  0  -10709 -176
-651  0  4059  651 -10451  -1658  0 -10451  2400.6
Central bank's  exposure: euro  Sovereign debt: US$
Source: World Bank staff estimates
With respect to the current account flows, Bulgaria's  large share of foreign and domestic
debt denominated in US dollar broadly satisfies general hedging objectives.  This holds, even
though, the lev is pegged to the Euro, making Bulgaria's  exposure to currency risk determined
primarily by the US dollar/Euro exchange rate.  Indeed, strengthening of the dollar since October
1998 (Chart 5) had so far cost Bulgaria's budget an extra $80-100 million in debt service cost.  In
the current account, however, this  loss was mirrored by increases in the  dollar-denominated
export revenues.  Chart 6 compares currency composition of net merchandise exports and debt
service payments in  1998 and  shows that the US  dollar exposure on the sovereign debt was
broadly matched by the dollar inflows on net exports.  The peg to the Euro serves as a natural
hedge to Bulgaria's large deficit in Euro-denominated trade.
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The natural  hedge  on the dollar,  however,  is not complete  and  is on the wane.  In 1998, the
mismatch  was some 20 percent  of the dollar-denominated  exports  of US$70  million;  in 1999 it is
estimated  to  over  1/3.  Chart  6 excludes  dollar  exposure  on  the  dollar-denominated  domestic
debt,  which  constitutes  another  10 percent.  And  there  is a  large  quarter-on-quarter  variance  in
the  currency  structure  of debt  service  against  foreign  trade,  exposing  the  country  to  short-term
currency  risk.
Interest  rate  risk in public  debt portfolio  is a more  serious  reason  for  concern.  The share
of floating  rate debt  in both  external  and  domestic  debt  portfolio  was over three  quarters  at end-
1998.  The drop  in LIBOR  over  1997-1998  made  this  to  government's  advantage,  lowering  its
debt  service costs.  Possible  increases  in LIBOR  in the future,  however,  will reverse  this trend.
Chart 7. Stress  testing:  the impact  of higher  interest  rates on the ratios  of...
debt  service-to-exports ...  ...  and debt service-to-budget  revenues
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16For external debt, the risk of losses on higher interest rates is significant. The relationship
between higher interest rates and debt service is exponential, as the interest costs will open wider
the financing gap in the future years.  Stress testing the debt service profile with an interest rates
increase of 1%, 2% and 3% (see chart 7), we find that higher interest rates would result in the
debt service to exports ratio to be on average higher than the baseline scenario by 1.5-5.2 percent
in 2000-2004'. Any increase of international interest rates in excess of 3% over the current levels
may  lead to  unsustainable  levels  of  debt  service.  The fiscal  impact  of  additional  interest
payments over 2000-2004 provides more comfort under the baseline scenario which assumes
continued strong fiscal performance. Nevertheless, higher international interest rates would add
from US$  95 million (for a  1 percent increase in interest rates) to US$  340 million (for a 3
percent increase) to the annual budget expenditures, or 1.5-6.5 percent increase in a debt service
to revenue ratio in 2000-2004.
Domestic interest payments represent the equivalent of a mere quarter of the external debt
interest payments, but they are more volatile than the latter.  As the domestic  fixed income
market is shallow, it is extremely sensitive to shocks. In 1999, a combination of factors caused a
rise of yields on domestic debt by 4-5 percentage points, while the effective cost of Bulgaria's
external debt had risen by less than 1 percent. In a not unlikely scenario, an increase in domestic
interest rates in parallel with international rates may raise government debt service costs by 1-2
percent  of  GDP  or  2-6  percent  of  the  1999 budget  revenues.  For  Bulgaria,  the  current
predominance of instruments with floating rates is thus quite risky. In the short run not much can
be  done about it, as the  government continues with  its prudent borrowing policy. Once this
policy bears its fruits in terms of improvement in sovereign risk rating and decline in borrowing
costs, new borrowing decisions should aim to contain the interest risk in the debt portfolio by
contracting debt with fixed interest rates. At that time, a sensible interest-rate benchmark for both
external and domestic components of the debt portfolio should be constructed.
Risk  of  derivatives, as  volatility  in  the cost  of  derivative  instruments, is  negligible.
Similarly  to  other  sovereign  borrowers  with  sub-investment  grade  ratings,  Bulgaria  faces
difficulties in  accessing derivative markets  and  finding the needed  counterparties.  Bulgaria
would benefit particularly from  interest rate swaps and  currency swaps to  smooth the fiscal
impact of exchange and interest rates volatility.  But possible availability of derivatives also
makes the development and application of asset and liability management framework for risk
management more urgent.
Institutional and  transaction risk  refers  to  possible  failures  in  the  debt  management
processes.  Since 1998, Bulgaria has been systematically strengthening its debt management
capacities.  As one of the steps, the Ministry of Finance has consolidated debt management into a
single Department for Government Debt.  The department includes specialized units that manage
and  track  debt,  guarantees,  and  on-lending.  Bulgarian  National  Bank  (BNB),  as  the
Government's  fiscal agent, conducts primary  auctions of  government securities  and aims at
The baseline  scenario  is based  on the Ministry  of Finance  assumptions  about the future  track  of international
interest  rates.
17deepening the  secondary  market.  Both  the  BNB  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance  have  been
enhancing their debt tracking systems.  The BNB debt monitoring  system tracks both external
and domestic debt, but generates only external debt service projections.  Debt database of the
Ministry  of Finance  covers  state  guarantees as  well as  the  entire  government  debt, but  its
projection and reporting engines are under development.
Both institutions lack tools to analyze debt sustainability and to assess risks of their asset
and liability portfolios.  There exists no structured procedure to  assess and compare the risk
exposures, and decisions are thus made with little reference to any risk management objectives.
For example, servicing the dollar-denominated debt from the Euro or lev accounts alters the net
combined exposure of the fiscal authorities and the Bulgarian National Bank, thereby adding to
Bulgaria's fiscal vulnerability.  As a hurdle in the development of further institutional capacities,
both the Ministry of Finance and Bulgarian National Bank suffer from high staff turnover.
The  system  for  transaction  processing  remains  complex,  with  several  overlapping
procedures in the Ministry of Finance and the BNB. It has been successful in preventing any
payment  slippage  since  1994,  but  in  some  instances,  erroneous  decisions with  regards to
accounts  and  source of  funds  used  for  debt  servicing have  increased  debt  servicing  costs.
Streamlining the transaction processing within the overall Treasury management framework is
therefore strongly warranted.
The proposed reform would bring social security under control
Bulgaria's  government legally guarantees an old-age pension  and other social security
programs.  Social security guarantees are becoming fiscally expensive.  Bulgaria has 2.4 million
pensioners and 3.2 million insured in the mandatory social security system.  The old dependency
ratio, as the share of population aged 60 plus to those between 15-59, has surpassed 0.43.  The
system dependency ratio, as the share of pensioners to the working population, has  exceeded
0.75.  Social security programs are exerting increasing pressures on the budget, rising from 9
percent of GDP in 1997 to 13 percent in 1999.  Social security programs include: (a) retirement
and various social pensions, (b) unemployment and one-off retraining benefits, (c) various social
assistance programs for specific groups (students, families with numerous children, and others),
and  (d) social  benefits paid through the  municipal budgets, but  subsidized from  the central
budget, for the uninsured and poor.
The government spends 9 percent of GDP on old-age and social pensions.  The pension
system suffers from arrears in contributions (200 million BGN, which is about 1 percent of GDP,
as we will discuss in the enterprise section of this paper) but not from any arrears in benefits
payment.  With no reform, expected demographic trends threaten to generate cash deficits in the
pension  system of nearly 2.7 percent of GDP by 2002  (table 3).  To contain these expected
increases, the government proposes to downsize the existing pay-as-you-go, improve options for
voluntary private pension saving, and introduce mandatory defined contribution professional and
employer  saving plans.  Proposed changes into the present pay-as-you-go  system  include  a
18gradual increase in the retirement age and its convergence for men and women 9, transfer of the
responsibility  for early  retirement  to  professional pension  funds, and  adoption of  universal
mandatory pension contributions based on salary levels.  On the front of other social security
programs,  government  particularly  aims  at  restricting  access to  short-term  social  security
payments.
Table 3 Projected Social Security Expenditures
Projected  pension  Projected  pension  Total social  security  Total  social  security
deficits:  w/o  reform  deficits:  w/reform  spending  w/o  reform  Spending  w/reform
BGN, mil  % of GDP  BGN,mil  %ofGDP  BGN, mil  % of GDP  BGN, mil  %of  GDP
2000  489  2.1  492.9  2.1  2081  8.9  2041  8.7
2001  648  2.6  476.21  1.9  2405  9.5  2176  8.6
2002  744  2.7  524.81  1.9  2700  9.9  2408  8.8
Source: NSSI
Under the reform scenario, projections of government pension expenditures look more
reassuring, with incurred cash deficits around 2 percent of GDP.  Projections shown in table 4
assume  the envisaged  increases in  the  retirement  age,  reductions in  pay-as-you-go pension
benefits, but  also higher compliance, resulting  in a cash  deficit of around  1 percent of GDP
annually, for the next five years.
Table 4. Projected Public Pension Expenditures After Reform
I  |  Total  Outlays  Annual Cash  Deficit/Surplus
Years  BGN,  mi  % of GDP  BGN,  mil  % of GDP
1999  2173  9.5  -114.  0.5
2000  2315  10.1  -296  1.3
2001  2432  10.0  -262  1.1
-2002  2550  9.8  -240  0.9
2003  2667  9.7  -238  0.9
2004  2743  9.4  -341  1.2i
2005  2780  9.0  -261  0.9
2006  2802  8.6  -130  0.4
2007  2798  8.2  45  0.1
2008  2798  7.9  169  0.5
2009  2802  7.5  309  0.8
2010  2848  7.4  420  1.1
2011  2877  7.1  796  2.0
Source:  Agency  for Economic  Analysis  and Forecasting
Hence, according to the above calculations provided by two different sources in Bulgaria,
deficit from pension and other social security benefits could range between 1 and 2 percent of
GDP per year in the next 12 years.  The state has provided no guarantee or commitment under
9  The present  retirement  age (55 for women  and 60 for men)  will be preserved  until  2003.  After the year
2003,  the retirement  age for men will grow  by 4 months  each  year until it reaches  the age of 65. The retirement  age
for women  will grow  by 6 months each  year until it reaches  the age  of 63.
19the planned pillar  2  and  3.  Therefore, no  explicit fiscal liabilities are expected from  these
programs in future. 1I
Health financing is likely to grow, either directly or through contingencies
Similarly to  social security, Bulgaria's  government also legally guarantees its citizens'
access to healthcare.  Health care has been available free of charge to the population, costing the
government budget around 4 percent  of GDP.  Since population  aging often has a  stronger
impact on the cost of health care than pensions, the budget may expect increasing pressures.  In
this  respect,  health-financing obligation  of  the  state  is  of  direct  nature.  The  government,
however, has been considering a reform that would reduce direct budgetary health outlays, but
introduce another, contingent portion of public financing in the new health system.  Law on
Health Insurance, which has established a National Health Insurance Fund to partly cover health
care cost, formulates an obligation for the state to cover the Fund's  possible future deficits as
well as to pay contributions of all of the state employees as their employer.  Table 6  shows
expected sources of health financing in the reformed system.
Table 6  Health Fund: Expected Revenues
1999  2000  2001
BGNmil  % of GDP  BGN mil  % of GDP  BGN  mil  % of GDP
Health insurance contributions  257  1.2  577  2.4  650  2.5
o/w from government  97  0.5  213  (.9  231  0.5
State budget  806  3.6  840  4.0  1,035  4.1
Total  1063  4.8  1417  6.4  1,685  6.6
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Contingent government liability arising from the new arrangement will realize, should the
NHIF face difficulties in collecting health contributions.  Collection difficulties may arise from
the complexity of the Fund's  contribution structure.  Contributions will be levied on the higher
income  family member, with additional amounts imposed for dependlents and other non-wage
earners. The system  would require detailed monitoring of family relationships and incomes.
Collection and enforcement problems are particularly expected vis-a-vis non-cash compensations
and self employed.  Furthermore, the Fund is designed to contract health services with health
providers.  Thus,  government's  obligation  to  cover  the  Fund's  deficits  is  likely  to  erode
incentives in the entire health system and to become costly, also for ihe state budget.  Initially
envisaged for mid-1999, actual payments  under the new system have been postponed to mid-
2000 in view of the above-mentioned implementation problems.
2. Direct implicit Risks
Public Investment Program may generate significant fiscal pressures
Bulgaria's  Public Investment Program,  first  developed  in  1998 for  years  1998-2001,
offers many positive  features but  also suffer  from  weaknesses experienced  earlier by  other
10  In the early stages of the new program design, we found it impossible to estimate any possible implicit
liabilities  that might  arise  from pillars  2 and 3.
20countries.  Particularly, Public Investment Program does not include estimates of recurrent and
maintenance cost implications of proposed investment programs.  This shortcoming may lead to
unexpected pressures on the budget in the future and, consequently, to  disruptions in further
investment programs  as  well  as  in  the  provision  of  expected  services.  In  addition,  risks
associated with Bulgaria's  investment program are three-fold: (a) project and program quality,
(b) availability of expected financing schemes, and (c) counterpart requirements.
Public  Investment  Program  covers  planned  capital expenditure  by  the  state  budget,
budgetary  spending  agencies,  large  state-owned  enterprises,  and  funds,  such  as  National
Environmental Protection Fund, Republican Road Network Fund, National Telecom System, and
Air Traffic Management.  The PIP is an integral part of the organic budget law of the current
year and  indicative  for the  following  years.  Over the  last three  years  public  investment
expenditure increased from 1 percent of GDP in 1997 to 3.5 percent in 1999.  The Government
program for 2000-2006 fixes public investment at 3.5 percent of GDP per year. This limit may
come under significant pressures from competing requirements of  infrastructure rehabilitation,
environmental clean-up,  institutional  capacity building,  restructuring  of  social  services, and
poverty  alleviation programs,  all  key  to  the  country's  development  and  growth  and/or EU
accession.
Project quality risk mainly emerges from capacities of the sectoral agencies, which are
responsible for economic and financial analysis and for the overall soundness of their proposals.
The agencies'  capacities, however,  vary  greatly and  most  agencies suffer from  tight human
resource limitations.  Similar problems are facing the Ministry of Finance, which is responsible
for review and prioritization of proposals prior to submitting them to the Council of Ministers." 1
Thus, project proposals are not necessarily well designed and well assessed.  Coupled with the
fact  that  PIP  does  not  include  recurrent  and  maintenance  cost  implications  of  investment
programs, this may cause that future pressures on the budget exceed expectations.
Financing risk, risk that pre-identified sources of financing fall short, is also real. The
1998-2001 PIP envisages a US$3.9 billion investment program for the public sector. Out of this,
US$2.6 billion belongs to state-owned enterprises.  The state is expected to guarantee credits to
finance  over half of  the  investments.  As  we  will discuss  further, many  large state-owned
enterprises  are  incurring  losses  and  accumulating  arrears.  Unless  these  enterprises  are
restructured to  become commercially and financially viable  entities, state guarantees on their
credits may produce significant contingent fiscal risk for future state budgets.
Counterpart requirements mainly relate to Bulgaria's investment-related borrowing from
International Financial Institutions and EU accession funds.  EU programs, such as SAPARD
(Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development), require government to co-
Selection criteria are established by  the Council of Ministers to  emphasize: (a) compliance  with the
governmental  development  strategy, (b) contribution  to economic growth and employment creation, (c)
regional, social and ecological priorities, (d) reduction in the amounts of  incomplete  construction,  (e)
mobilization  of external funds, (f) project readiness,  and (g) administrative  readiness  and implementation
capacity. The  PIP is now expected  to be closely  linked  with the new, seven-year  national  strategy.
21finance between 25 and 50 percent of investment cost.  These requirements do not produce fiscal
risk by themselves but require attention in order to have the needed room in future budgets.
3. Contingent explicit risks
State guarantees are not large but should be treated with caution
In 1999, Bulgaria has reported about 17 percent of GDP of outstanding state guarantees
(table 7).  This amount includes 9 percent of GDP of IMF debt that: is intermediated by the
Bulgarian National Bank.  There is no doubt that state budget will cover IMF debt repayment.
Thus, in our framework we consider IMF debt as a direct rather than contingent liability of the
fiscal authorities, and thus analyzed it as a part of sovereign debt above.
Table 7  Bulgaria: Publicly Guaranteed Debt Outstanding (end of 1998)
Amount  As % of GDP
External  (US$  million)  1596  13.0
IMF  1114  9.1
Others  482  3.9
Domestic  (BGN million)  840  3.9
Source:  Ministry  of Finance  and Bulgarian  National  Bank  (Monthly  Bulletin,  December  1998)
Non-IMF state-guaranteed foreign debt, reaching almost 4 percent of GDP, is dominated
by official creditors on the financing side (99 percent) and infrastructure state-owned enterprises
(92 percent) as the debtors (see Annex 2).  The main source (95 percent) of domestic guarantees
are obligations of (that is deposits in) the State Savings Bank.  For this Bank, the guarantee fully
covers deposits  denominated in  domestic currency until  April  2000.  After  this  date,  these
deposits become  subject to  the Deposit Insurance Law, which provides  for  limited coverage
under the Deposit Insurance Fund.
6hart 8  Fiscal risk  of guaranteed  debt  Excluding  the  IMF  debt  and
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Bank's  deposits  before  April  2000
i5%  I  unlikely,  the  amount  of  outstanding
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_%  ________________________  60O/;  Republic  (Brixi and  Ghanem,  1999),
this amount is not excessive.  But most
0.0%  !  of these guarantees are risky.  Most of
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  the state-owned enterprises, which are
Source:  World  Bank  staff  estimates  their  main  beneficiaries  (covered
IL  --  - - - - --  debtors),  have  been  incurring  losses
22and accumulating arrears in taxes, social security contributions, and/or wages, and/or to their
suppliers." 2 Prior to the end of 1998, 13 domestic and two external guarantees have been called.
Expanding our ALM approach to cover contingent liabilities, we mainly observe that enterprise
debt covered by state guarantees largely has floating interest rate and is denominated in foreign
currency. An increase in interest rates and appreciation of the dollar vis-A-vis  the Euro will make
the guarantees more likely to be called as well as will raise the budgetary cost of each guarantee
called.  Chart 8 shows future possible  budgetary cost of the  outstanding external guarantees
(excluding the IMF guaranteed debt) according to different default risk levels.  The maturity of
enterprise debt is relatively short, thus front-loading the fiscal risk of the existing guarantees.
Under a 60-percent default scenario, the fiscal loss would range between 1.2 and 1.4 percent of
budget revenues in 2000-2004.'3
The demand for new guarantees is high emanating both from official donors and the
private sector. Box 1, below illustrates the case of the energy sector.
The  government  has  established  a  simple  framework  for  dealing  with  guarantees.
Particularly the government has developed a comprehensive register of guarantees (placed in the
State Audit Office as well as both the Ministry of Finance and Bulgarian National Bank) and
introduced regular publishing of the aggregate amounts of guarantees outstanding along with
government debt figures. The register covers all external and domestic guarantees, indicating the
beneficiary,  creditor,  project  title,  amount,  currency,  and  debt  repayment  schedule.  The
government also centralized the issuance of new guarantees and subjected each new guarantee to
executive  and  legislative  scrutiny  associated with  regular  budget  process.  Each  guarantee
request,  accompanied by  opinion of  appropriate line  ministries,  has to  be  reviewed  by the
Ministry of Finance.  With opinion of the Ministry of Finance and possible input of the State
Audit  Office, each  guarantee needs  an  approval by  Council  of  Ministers  and  Parliament's
ratification.
In terms of nominal limits, Decree 482 of 1997 set the annual limit on guarantees (face
value) issued at 20 percent of expected budget revenues.  A recent amendment to this Decree,
however,  dropped the  complementary ceiling of 20  percent of GDP  on the total  amount of
guaranteed debt outstanding (replacing it with a flexible ceiling to be set in the budget process
each year).  This change significantly expands the legal room for the government to issue new
guarantees.  Moreover, relatively lax limits on guarantee amounts are accompanied by flexible
reserve requirements.  So far, the government has followed prudent reserve policy, though not
underpinned by any rules or clear risk assessment practices.  The state budget included reserves
in the amount of 50 and 20 percent of the total scheduled guaranteed debt repayment (normally
to be paid directly by the debtors) in 1998 and 1999, respectively.  Furthermore, under guarantee
12  Beneficiaries  of state  guarantees  include  such  continued  loss-makers  as  the  Bulgarian  Railways,  Bourgas  Port,
and Maritza Iztok mines.  Other large loss-makers  with obligations  covered by the state, such as Zarneni
Hrani,  are in  the process  of shutting  down.
13  In Hungary  and the Czech  Republic,  state guarantees  covering  all risks under the contract  have been called
with  roughly  20 and 40 percent  probability.
23Box I  Bulgaria:  F  .iscA  riksassociated  w ith the  energy  sector
Fiscal risks arise on account of state ownership  of energy  enterprises  and the responsibility  of the Government  to
guarantee;  either directly or indi  rectI.  e  obigions  of state-owned  enterprises  (SEs).  The  tain  sources of
existing  and expected  fiscal isk associated  with Bulgaria's  energy sector include:  (a) non-payment/non-collection
for energy  services,  resulting  in accounts  payable;  (b) inadequate  tiffs  to cover reasonaesupply  costs, resulting
in the need for direct budget  support  or a cross-subsidy  between  consumer  grops: (c) non-ompitiveness  of coal
and briquette  enterprises,  resultiggin  rdirec  b  et subsidi tomigeeial  i  of  mine closures  or
cross-subsidization  by power  compaies;c(d  implicit state guara  sloans  to energy SEs(wing  t  state
ownership  or control of enterprises);  (e) explicit  stte  guarantees  for loas to energy SOEs;  f) explicit  or implicit
: state  rguantees  of long.term  tiaer-ayb  contracts  and othera  obligtns.  Fiscal risk associa  ith  (a)-d  are
relatively  well understood  and addresse.  Fiscal risk  assot  with  grtet  Ss  loans  and  take  or  pay
conltracts  are gowing rapidly and  will be the  imost  challenging  to  manga  to mitigate.  investment  requirements
are being driven by EU Accession requirements (nuclear safety, environet  6:pecrforance,  and  technical
"Pcmatibility),  extemnal  and dorestic  demand considtions,  and  reliility  and  eficiency  improvements  in
:existing  electricity  and heat  services  to underpin econotic growth  anod  social  prtection.
Fiscal risks associated with (e) and (f) are. likely to  increase rapidly iif investetto  mdernize  energy
infrastrcture and meet EU Accession  requirements  are no  carefully  selected or properlytrcud.  While the
Governnt  rightly intends to  naximize  the use of privt  capital  to minimize  fiscal  risks,  ongoig  sector
restructuring and  privatization should ensure that private investors and -operators increasiny  assume all
commercial  risks.  State guarantees  should only be considered  for sound projects  and wherethey  are  neede  to
secure private  financing  for  tprcwiut  which the countyt's economic  grotorIsocial  cndition  wouid be
With  regard to (e). in 1999-2000  state guarantees  havebeen provided  or are beig  c6onside  fr  investment  loans
of about $850 million  to be implemented  in the 2000-[2004period.  These  ind  inents  in nuclear plant
0safety,  waste  disposal,  and  plant upgrade  ($380  million)  eleticity  ntransmissionHbn  a  t(  150  million),  district
heatingf  ($20  million),  and expansion  of gas transit  city  toTurkey $47 million). The implied  level  of energ-
rele  guarantees  approximatesthe  amount  of overall  intatees  at end 1998.
With  regard  to (f), an explicit  state  guarantee  has been provided  for the gas supply contract  betwee Buaaz  and
Gazprom,  signed in May 1998  Mwhich  requires  Bulgaria  to take or pay for pre-determined  annual: volue  of gas
juntil  [201i}  OThe  contracted  volumefotr  1999  (4.0 billion  cubic  meters)  is valued  at $320 ilon.  Aslightly her
volumue  is:cntracted  for 2000.The  continued decline  1sindeand  is li  to  resu0t  an  oliton  top  aginstthe
part  of th contracted  volnumethat  isnot takeng.  c  ff -- 
Implicit  or explicit  state guaratees are alsobeig  considerd  fr  long-term  take-or-pay  power  purhase  agreements
(PPA) between  the state-owned  National  Electricitv  Company  (NEK)  and  privatiz  p  rr  s.  The first
PPA,  to support  a $400  million  rehabilitation  projet (840 MW),  would  ose  an oblgatigon  onEof  abot  $180
million/year  fir 15 years  in electricity  off-take and fuel supy  uponompletion  o  fthe  t.  Similarly,  the
second PPA,  to support  a $1.0 billion new plant (600 MW)  would impose  an obligation  on NEK of  abut $1S75
million/year for  10-15 years.  To the  extent  possible, these deals should  be  structured  after  reforms  are  more
advancedand  the investors, not NEKM  can take more of the market ris:k.
24contracts the government always covers all risks, without analyzing their determinants, and the
full amount  of debtor's  obligation.  Official  creditors, providing  concessional resources  for
development projects and balance of payment support, dominate the list of creditors and require
full risk coverage by the government.  If extended to commercial creditors, this practice has,
negative implications for market behavior, creating moral hazard on  the side of debtors  and
creditors.  Finally,  for  guarantees  as  for  debt management,  government lacks  capacities to
analyze and control risk.  The capacities to design private-public risk sharing mechanisms are
also to be developed at the MOF.  Compared with other advanced EU accession countries (see
box  2),  Bulgaria's  problems  in  managing  guarantees  appear  smaller.  As  we  have noted,
however, its need for caution is much greater.
Box  2  Managing  contingent  liabilities  ir the Czech  Republic
The managent  of contingent  liabilities  in the Czech  Republic  suffers  from  two  major  weaknesses.  First,  the
institutional  framework  does not encourage  adequate  prioritization  in the use of guarantees. Second,  the fraiework
neither  encourages  pricing  of guarantees  nor sets  sensible  nominal  limits  on  their  amounts.
First,  the law authorizing  guarantees  contains  no guidance  on when  guarantees  are the appropriate  public  policy
instrument  or how  they  should.be  compared  to other  fonns of state  assistance.  "This  shortcoming  has created  an incentive
for  entities  and  spending,  ministries  unable  to secure  the desired  level  of state  assistance  through  the budgetary  process  to
seek state  assistance  outside  of the budget  process  through  loan  guarartees. The additional  state  assistance  provided  via
guarantees  is perceived  as cost free and is not included  in the overall  financial  support  provided  to a given sector.
.guarantees  are often  extended  as a result of emergency  and political  pressure  rather  than as a result of a strategic
decision  to support  outcomes..."
Second,  in the absence  of systematic  budgeting,  one way to contain  contingent  liabilities  is to place limnits  on
their  issuance.  In  the Czech  Republic,  the sum  of expected  payments  on guaranteed  loans  in  a calendar  year  is required  to
be lower  than  8 percent  of the expected  state  budget  revenues.  This  limit  is too high. In Hungary,  the limit  is set at I
percent  of the face  value  of the guaranteed  amount,
The Czech  system  is ahead  of systems  in  other  countries  in as muh as procedures  are in place  to document  the
contingent  liabilities,  to categorize  theem  acording to:  risk categories,  and to analyze  the government  exposure. The
payments  made  under  guarantees  called  are also  recorded.
Sour"c:  Bfixi  and  Ghanem,  1999,  and  Brixi.  Papp  and  Schick,  1999.
Large environment damages need to be  financed
Bulgaria's  Environment Protection Law states that the state will not be liable for past
environmental damages of enterprises privatized before February 1999. In addition, to comply
with  EU  environment  regulations,  by  2015  Bulgaria  will  need  to  finance  large  environmental
improvements as well as adopt new legislation and institutional arrangements.  The Ministry of
Environment  and Water  estimates  the  1999-2015  cost of containing  past  environmental  damage
and  financing  the  required  treatment  of water  supplies,  management  and  disposal  of solid  and
hazardous  wastes,  and  air  clean  up  to  come  up  to  US$8.5  billion 14. Assuming  equal  annual
14  Assessment  for general costs to be incurred  in order to reach EU standards  in treatment  of water supply,
management  and  disposal  of solid and hazardous  wastes  and air pollution  clean-up  during 1999-2015  prepared
by Halgrove Associates  funded by EU PHARE.  This estimate is the most comprehensive  one currently
available and covers the overall costs of containment  of past environmental  damage and implementing
programs  to attain  EU standards  for pollution  and emission  control,  including  the possibility  of closing  the old
nuclear  plants.
25amounts, the government will need nearly US$570 million (about BGNl  billion) annually. The
2000-2006 PIP envisages annual amounts of US$400 million.
Based  on  the  above  overall  estimate, the  Ministry  of  Environment  and  Water  and
Ministry of Finance have developed a forecast investment program for ecological improvements
for 2000-200615.  The government estimates the total minimum required expenditures in 2000-06
around USD2.8 billion.
How large obligations will guaranteed agencies be permitted to accumulate?
Business Promotion Bank, recently established with 95 percent government ownership, is
based on a German model and a recipient of a credit line on concessional terms from Germany.
Its main objective is to  channel long term credit to  small and mediurn size enterprises.  The
government guarantees repayment of the German credit line as well as other foreign borrowing
by the Bank.  The government does not guarantee its deposits.  The Bank is not operating yet,
leaving, for the time being, the risk-exposure of the state near zero.
Bulgarian Export Insurance Agency was established in 1998 as a joint stock company,
with  the  Minister  of  Trade  and  Tourism  representing  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  as  the  major
shareholder, to provide exporters with insurance policies to cover political  and medium-term
commercial risks.  The Agency's  capital is about DM  10 million.  On its  own account, the
agency will ensure export credits, guarantees and financial losses against short term credit risks.
On the government account and with full government guarantee, the agency insures against non-
commercial and medium and long-term commercial risk.  According to the Export Insurance
Law,  a limit for the export credit  insurance benefiting from  Governnent  support  should be
imposed in the State budget annually.  For 1999, the Parliament approved a DM30 million limit.
The coverage against short-term commercial risk protects Bulgarian exporters against permanent
insolvency and protracted default of the foreign buyer for up to 85 percent of the incurred loss.
The  coverage  against  non-commercial risk  protects  the  Bulgarian  exporter  against  default
payment by the foreign buyer as a result of war, revolution, host government's moratorium on
debt, expropriation, nationalization and similar.  The insurance covers no more than 90 percent
of the insured loss.  The coverage against medium and long term commercial risk protects the
Bulgarian exporter against permanent insolvency and protracted default of the foreign buyer, up
to 85 percent of the incurred loss.  On the government account, the Agency has also started an
export credit insurance against short-term non-commercial risk from private and public foreign
15  This investment  expenditure  program covers:  (a) support to the municipal  water treatment/sewage  systems
programs; (b)  past  environmental  damage containment expenses for  'large  polluters' in  mining and
metallurgy,  chemicals  and petrochemicals,  oil refining and petroleum  distribution  that will be privatized;  (c)
support for the disposal of solid waste programs  for the municipalities;  (d) disposal of hazardous waste
programs  for closed mines; (e) rectifying  the hazardous  sulfur  emission  from thermal  power plants; (f) past
environmental  damage  containment  investments  for the non-privatized  ore mines(coal)  and liquidated/closed
entities;  and, (g) some estimates  for compensating  the land-owners  for recultivation  of the contaminated  land
around  the industrial  sites. It does not cover the disposal  of solid waste from closed uranium  mines,  phasing
out the old nuclear  plant,  and conversion  of thermal  power  plant inputs  from lignite  to better quality  coal.
26buyer.  Demand for this  as well as other policies is, however, still very limited, keeping the
state's risk exposure very low.
State Fund for  Agriculture,  under the Ministry of Agriculture and with its obligations
explicitly guaranteed by the state, provides financial support to the agricultural sector through
short and long term loans, credit lines, interest subsidies and guarantees.  Credit lines channeled
through  commercial  banks  support  long-term  agricultural  investment.  The  number  of
commercial banks participating in this program has increased from 2 in  1998 to  11 in  1999.
Through an irrevocable order of payments issued by the commercial banks in favor of the Fund,
credit risk  appears fully assumed by the banks.  The State Fund for Agriculture charges the
commercial bank a 2 percent  interest rate, the banks charge the producers  6 percent, and the
remaining 4 percent cover the bank's margin.  In the context of market interest rates, the implicit
subsidy to the producer is about 10 percent of the credit amount outstanding annually.  This
program is growing rapidly from  150 projects approved for BGN  11 million  in  1998, to  350
projects and BGN 24 million  credit in mid 1999. In addition to yearly allocation from the state
budget,  this  program  is  supported  by  a  revolving  fund  financed  from  repayments  by  the
commercial banks.  Direct  support to  agriculture producers is also  provided through  interest
subsidy and short-term credit.  Support under these programs amounted to BGN 46 million  in
1998 and was scaled down to BGN 35 million  in 1999.  These programs are being phased out
and expected to disappear by 2001.16
While the short term support programs are subject to a yearly limit in the budget law, no
ceiling is imposed on the volume of long-term investment credit.  In addition, a new instrument
is being introduced whereby commercial banks would extend long-term credit from their own
resources with a full guarantee of the State Agricultural Fund.  It is unclear whether the Fund's
guarantees are subject to any specific limit.  Finally, under the Grain Law, public warehouses
will be established and warehouse receipts could be pledged as collateral for commercial bank
credit.  The State Fund for Agriculture is expected to participate to this scheme through provision
of guarantee or participation in an indemnity fund.
4. Contingent implicit risks
Enterprise obligations may turn out expensive
Enterprise restructuring has been slow in Bulgaria, and state-owned enterprises have been
accumulating losses and arrears. In 1999, arrears reached nearly 2 billion lev (around 8.5 percent
of GDP), concentrated primarily in  about 90 largest enterprises.  These include the Bulgarian
Railways, Bulgargaz (energy) and Neftochim (chemicals). Out of the total amount, about one
half are due in taxes and social security contributions and have led in the past to shortfalls in tax
and social security revenues.  The other half is largely due to  suppliers (mainly energy state-
owned enterprises), leaving around 2.3 percent in wages due to employees.
16  The Fund's revenue  base consists  of allocations  from state budget  and of fees from leased  state  properties. A
2-percent  levy recently introduced  on the turnover  of agro-processing  companies  is subject  to cancellation  in
December  1999  under  the government  program  supported  by the IMF-EFF.
27Future possible clean up of these obligations may negatively affect the budget as far as
the arrears to suppliers and enterprise employees go.  Should the government be liable for tax
and social security contribution arrears, their payment from the budget would be an accounting
procedure of no consequence for the fiscal balance. In order to break the inter-enterprise chain of
arrears leading to  accumulation of tax  arrears, the government is implementing a strategy to
recapitalize enterprises and thus enable them to pay suppliers (typically the gas and energy public
monopolies), who would in turn pay tax and social contributions arrears to the budget.  In order
to limit moral hazard, this operation is available as a once-off option at the time of privatization.
Without  hard  budget  constraint,  however,  future  problems  in  collecting  taxes  and  social
contributions from enterprises  would translate in revenue shortfalls and affect  government's
fiscal position
An  implicit  fiscal pressure from  municipalities?
Municipal borrowing is subject to a legal limit of 10 percent of their annual revenues.
Out of this amount, as much as 10 percent of the preceding month's revenues can be in the form
of a short-term interest-rate free credit from the central budget.  Municipalities are allowed to
seek the remaining credit from commercial banks and from other municipalities.  For this credit,
municipalities can request state guarantee.  Furthermore, subject to further market development
and to the approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission, municipalities will be able to
issue bonds.  Sofia already successfully issued bonds in Luxembourg for 50 million Euro.  The
existing law  is not  clear whether bond debt is subject to the overall indebtedness rules.  As
experience in  many south  American countries, including Argentina, Brazil,  and  Mexico has
illustrated,  markets  often  perceive  municipal  bonds  as  implicitly  (even  when  clearly  not
explicitly) guaranteed by the state" 7. Possible increases in municipal credit in any form may thus
bring about strong pressure on the fiscal authorities in case of default. The government is closing
some of these loopholes in the 2000 budget law.
Fiscal risk for the central government may also emerge from municipal guarantees and
other contingent municipal obligations.  These are not currently regulated under any existing law.
Thus, municipalities face no ceiling on the number and overall value of guarantees they can
issue.  Further  risk  of a  financial pressure  to  spill  over  from  municipalities  to  the  central
government relate  to  the  municipal ownership of  loss-making and  indebted  enterprises  and
financial  institutions.  The  spill-over  mechanism  is  likely  to  be  the  stronger,  the  more
municipalities become responsible for the provision of core public services.  Central government
may find it plausible to let a municipality default on its debt to commercial banks.  Possible
subsequent  failure  of  the  municipality  to  deliver  such  core  services as  running  water  and
schooling may be, however, politically too sensitive to let the central government abstain from
"~emergency"  financial support.  On the positive side, the State Audit Office is authorized and
active in screening municipal performance and financial management. The cost of nuclear safety
is not yet fully known.
Dillinger and Webb, 1998.
28Major government financing may be required by Bulgaria's nuclear power program.  The
Kozloduy nuclear power plant site has 2 units of 1000 MW each and 4 units of 440 MW each.
International observers have declared the 2 large units in compliance with environmental damage
containment measures. The other 4, older, units are determined by the European Commission for
an  early  closure,  on  the  basis  of  a  Nuclear  Safety  Account  Agreement.  The  cost  of
decommissioning of the power plant has not been taken into account in the past (for example,
depreciation costs have not  been integrated into the energy prices).  Bulgaria's  government,
while  implementing  short-term  safety  program,  indicated  in  the  context  of  EU  accession
discussions, its preparedness to implement the decommissioning in two steps, closing down 2
units by 2003 and the other 2 before 2008, possibly by 2006.8
Fiscal risk from the financial sector is currently low
Bulgarian bankers, regulators and depositors were badly burnt by the experience of 1996-
97.  Their response has been one of caution.  This limits the fiscal risk that needs to be accounted
for. Risks from the past  mainly relate to possible ongoing fiscal risk of past bank failures.  In
practice,  high  inflation has  eroded much  of the  continuing  claims  on  banks in  liquidation.
Recoveries from these liquidations are expected low but still uncertain. Bulgarian National Bank
indicates that government claims on past failed banks amount to 400 million lev." 9 Remaining
non-government deposit claims total about BGN  160 million.  The government rules out any
further  compensation of  non-government  claims  (of which  50  percent  were  compensated).
Unrecoverable claims by state-owned banks, including State Savings Bank,  on the liquidated
banks have already been fully provisioned.  The privatization of the remaining four banks might
realize less funds than had been originally hoped.  But further government injections needed are
unlikely to exceed BGN 100 million.
Risks from the current situation reflect several factors.  One very short-term potential risk
is liquidity risk that lies in the decision to transfer accounts of the central budgetary and extra-
budgetary funds, which are currently held by banks, to the government single treasury account
held by the central bank.  This transfer will not change the overall liquidity of the total banking
system.  However, transferring the accounts with all their deposits, estimated at 400 million lev,
will require individual banks to liquidate some of their asset portfolios (that is their holdings of
T-Bills, foreign exchange placements with overseas banks, and similar).  The selection of assets
to liquidate and conversion of remaining assets by banks may, however, cause temporary lack of
liquidity in the money markets.  This problem appeared in the early 1999 when around BGN 80
18  Discussions  on the timetable are still underway and exact costs of decommissioning  , future demand and
capacities  remaining  after the closing  of the old nuclear  units not yet fully worked  out. Similarly,  subsequent
price, income and substitution  effects on the household and enterprise sectors have not been analyzed.
Therefore,  no firm estimates  of new investment,  if needed,  to meet electricity  demand  are available.
19  Government  expects  several  payments  from the liquidations.  If transferred  to the Government's  account  at the
BNB  and sterilized  in the normal  way, as provided  for in  the currency  board arrangements,  this could  have  the
unintended  effect  of tightening  liquidity. While  this is a monetary  policy  issue,  and as such outside  the scope
of our paper,  any special  arrangements  adopted  to deal with  it, such  as special  deposits  retained  by
Government  in  commercial  banks,  could  conceivably  present  a longer-term  fiscal  risk.
29million  of funds collected  from  the proceeds of asset  sales  of banks  under  liquidation was
transferred to the account of the Ministry of Finance.
More generally, the major banking system risks are typically to be found in loan portfolio
weakness, interest rate or exchange rate risk, liquidity risk, or in self-dealing or fraud.  Past loan-
portfolio weaknesses have been flushed out by the crisis of 1996-97, ancd  indeed the real value of
any non-performing loans at that time has been substantially eroded.  The major state-owned
banks have since been under a privatization scrutiny, which has limited their appetite for any
risky lending, and this process also gives  some increased confidence in  the reliability of the
accounts and the classification of loans for most of these banks.  Manly of the second tier of
banks have received foreign capital accompanied by a degree of diligeince. Therefore, the true
aggregate capital position of the banks is likely to be fairly close to what they report.  That means
that aggregate compliance with capital standards is good, and that no immediate threat to the
limited resources of the deposit insurance fund exists, unless external cornditions  change.
Concerning the obligations of Deposit Insurance Fund, from January 1999, the blanket
deposit insurance, introduced during the crisis, was replaced by a new Deposit Insurance Fund.
The fund collects, relatively high by international standards, a levy of 0.5 percent on end-year
deposits of the banking system, and covers 95% of the first BGN 2,000  of any deposit, and 80%
of the remainder up to a maximum payoff of BGN 6,900.20 No estimate is currently available of
what the average percentage payoff from the actual distribution of deposits would be.  The figure
is likely to be as low as 40 percent or even less. 21
Despite a payoff of about BGN  10 million in  January  1999 (see below) the Deposit
Insurance Fund still has assets of about BGN 30 million (inclusive of an endowment of BGN 17
million).  Failing other calls on its resources, it will accumulate funds at a rate approaching BGN
25 million per annum at the current insurance levy rate.  The Banking Department deposits at the
Issue Department 22 are explicitly defined as the resources available for the lender of last resort
facility in case of a systemic crisis in  the banking sector. In  1999, these funds have covered
nearly 20 percent of total deposits net of settlement accounts and thus have provided additional
cushion to the Deposit Insurance Fund.  The Fund also has the authority  to increase this rate up
to 1.5 percent of end-of-year deposits.  If still inadequate, subject to parliamentary approval, the
20  Interestingly,  this insurance  cover differs from a common-sense  reading of the relevant legislation,  which
would  have limited  the payout  to BGN 4300. However,  the drafting  contained  an ambiguity,  and the higher
amount  was paid in the case of the Credit  Bank which had to be dealt with only days after the new scheme
came into effect.
21  On the other  hand, if closure  was preceded  by a lengthy  period  of suspicion,  experience  elsewhere  shows  that
uninsured  depositors  would  likely  withdraw  their deposits  before  failure,  leaving  the bank with a higher share
of insured  deposits.
22  The Issue Department  and the Banking Department  are the two principal  financial  departments  within the
Bulgaria  National  Bank,  following  the model  of the Bank of England. The Issue  Department  holds all of the
BNB's monetary  liabilities  and invests  the BNB's foreign  assets  subject  to restrictions  in terms of quality  and
liquidity  explicitly  stated  in the law on the BNB.  The Banking  Department  is responsible  for enforcing  reserve
requirements,  monitoring  financial  markets  and the payment  system.
30Fund can obtain credit from the government.  In the context of a wider possible "too big to fail"
policy, this recourse to the government allows bank failure to. present a fiscal risk.
Because of the relatively intense scrutiny of the larger banks, the likelihood of significant
self-dealing or fraud is limited.  There is no reported evidence of malpractice in the smaller banks
either, and these are supervised by the central bank.  The re-licensing process for insurance has
sharply reduced the potential for abuse in that sector.
Less is known about the business of finance houses, which enjoy very light prudential
regulation and supervision.  By far the largest of these has a balance sheet of the order of BGN
100 million and a  very small capital base.  Whatever the risks being faced by the investors
(whoever they may be) in such companies, it is unlikely that the fiscal authorities would meet
any deficiency here, so the fiscal risk remains small.
Banks' exposure to external risks entails three standard risks: (a) economic downturn, (b)
sharp and sustained interest rate movement, and (c) exchange rate change.  Ideally, a systematic
stress test would  be carried out  on each bank's portfolio to  assess the  impact of  substantial
adverse developments on all of these fronts.  Even without the data to conduct such an analysis,
preliminary  broad  estimates  can  give  an  indication of  the  broad  magnitude  of  risks  here.
Deriving these estimates, we treat the risks one-by-one, thought they could be correlated.
The risk of a sharp economic downturn that would affect loan recovery mainly correlates
with  such  events  as  Kosovo  crisis  or  as  deterioration  of  competitiveness  of  Bulgaria's
enterprises.  Most of the Bulgarian banks have sufficient capital to absorb even a substantial
increase in loan-losses.  The aggregate of capital and reserves in the banking system comes to
almost 60 percent of the net loan portfolio, and (with the exception of the SSB), each of the large
banks has sufficient capital to  absorb the  total loss of as much  as one-third of  its portfolio
without insolvency.  Further calculations will refine the picture, but it appears that, despite the
limited resources of the Deposit Insurance Fund, the banking system might not impose severe
direct fiscal costs arising from a major economic downturn.
Interest rate risk  is negligible for  most domestic  banks because nearly  all loans  and
deposits are subject to repricing on a monthly basis.  To the extent that banks are trying to profit
from the upward-sloping yield curve in foreign investments (as some are allegedly doing) there
could be a risk.  However, these positions are typically in major currencies such as dollar or euro,
where interest rate volatility is not very great.  Such positions would therefore present a risk to
bank profitability, but are most unlikely to be large enough to knock-on to the state budget.
Foreign exchange exposure may be a more significant issue.  There are three aspects to
this.  First the exposure of dollar against euro.  This is strictly limited by regulation for banks.
But it could be a problem for Bulgarian borrowers, whose receivables are in euro, but whose
loans are denominated in US dollars.  The existence of such cross-currency risk is generally
acknowledged, and  banks find themselves  in need for  greater hedging.  The second  foreign
exchange risk relates to open positions in lev against euro.  Overall, the banks are considered
long in Euro but a precise quantification is not available.  Such positions are not restricted by-
31regulation, the argument being that the currency board eliminates all such risk.  Of course, a
stress-test needs to take account of even highly unlikely events. Experience from other countries
shows it is exactly when a fixed peg comes under extreme pressure that large open positions
emerge.  Should lev interest rates rise as a result of pressure on the currency board, local banks
(following the example of Mexico, among other countries) might use their freedom to  take a
large long positions in lev to profit from the high local interest rates.  Were the currency board
subsequently to fail, this could result in widespread bank insolvency and a major fiscal risk.
Risks from  the future  are  limited  if  government  continues  in  tightening  prudential
regulations,  supervision  and  supervisory  practice  for  banks  and  non-banking  financial
institutions,  streamlining the institutional  structure for regulation of  pension  funds, finance
houses and  mutual funds and  improving effective implementation of  bankruptcy procedures.
Without continuous regulatory vigilance, a  risk may arise from the excessive  bank  capacity
relatively to the current and prospective market opportunities in Bulgaria.  As present behavior
would suggest, environment of low profitability may result in orderly exit of the least viable.
But international experience shows that it can also encourage reckless behavior as bank owners
or bank management "go for broke" when failure or exit is otherwise inevitable.  Finally, the
currency board arrangement may generate a  risk in  the long  term if  it  is not  supported by
adequate fiscal, income and structural policies.
III. Developing  Fiscal  Risk Management  Framework
1. Individual measures to address selectedfiscal risks
In this  section, we develop an action plan with measures to  reduce the  government's
exposure to fiscal risks.  We place emphasis on public finance institutional arrangements and
capacities rather than on structural policies.
Priorities for the short term
Continue cautious borrowing strategy, adjusting it to risk management objectives. Given
Bulgaria's  vulnerability to  shocks, policy makers need to  acknowledge the need to  minimize
volatility in government financing and in debt service cost.  By definition, a low- risk borrowing
strategy may be costlier than  an adventurous one. As the country rebuilds its creditworthiness, it
will become increasingly able to manage short-term external shocks and to reduce the effective
cost of its debt portfolio.
A strategy of low risk would imply the need to adjust the government debt structure as
well as to strictly limit contingent liabilities (see below).  The government will need to conduct a
detailed analysis of the structure of both relevant assets and liabilities and construct a benchmark
to outline an optimal debt portfolio.  Through possible buy-backs and through new borrowing on
as  needed basis  the  debt  management  office  then  can  gradually  adtjust the  sovereign  debt
structure in the appropriate direction.  Our brief analysis suggests that this direction is likely to
point toward the lev- and Euro-denominated, long-termn,  fixed-interest rate debt instruments. This
approach would result in a costlier, but low-volatility portfolio.
32While considering any new borrowing operation, Bulgaria will need to take into account
the risk structure of its  outstanding debt portfolio. This approach is particularly valuable for
heavily indebted borrowers, since its access to market-based tools is limited, principally because
of its credit rating. For example, of particular relevance for Bulgaria is the World Bank's new
loan product -- a fixed-spread loan, that has an interest rate based on LIBOR, plus a spread that
can be fixed for the life of the loan.  The product allows the borrowers to flexibly fix the interest
rate on disbursed amounts at any time during the life of the loan; to cap or collar it; to unfix or
refix the rate on disbursed amounts; and to change the currency and loan repayment terms, within
financial policy limits. This new product offers Bulgaria an attractive opportunity to increase the
flexibility of the government borrowing policy while keeping its low-risk profile. For example, it
may consider fixing the maturity of a new loan from the World Bank in such a way that it would
smooth the uneven debt servicing profile in the years ahead; or, balance the currency structure of
its outstanding obligations with the currency structure of its exports.
Additional opportunities to mitigate risks in the government asset/liability portfolio are
provided by the World Bank  hedging products such as interest rate swaps, caps and collars;
currency swaps; and commodity swaps. Again, tapping international derivatives' markets may be
prohibitively costly for Bulgaria at its level of creditworthiness. The Bank's  hedging products
will only be available to transform the risk structure of Bulgaria's debts to the World Bank. This
innovation  is  significant  both  because  the  bank's  share  of  Bulgaria's  overall  portfolio  is
substantial (and reducing the risk exposure on it would contribute to the broader risk containment
strategy of the governiment); and because the sovereign borrower  would thus gain experience
that may later be applied in the international derivatives' markets.
On the other side, Bulgaria's  return to  the international capital markets may still be
premature.  An early debut in the capital markets is unlikely to contribute to the reduction of the
effective cost of  external debt and  may (due  to  Bulgaria's  low  rating) even  exacerbate the
refinancing risk.  On the contrary, another two years of strong fiscal performance and rigorous
debt servicing are bound to further improve the country's sovereign rating and to reduce the cost
of new financing. Meanwhile, further debt buyback operations, similar to the buybacks executed
in 1999, may shave some percentage points off Bulgaria's public debt burden.  This will give it
larger windows of opportunity for more proactive debt management and borrowing policies years
ahead.
Define  strict  limits  for  and  build  reserves  to  cover  obligations  guaranteed  by  the
government.  Vulnerability to fiscal risks and of the EU accession objective require Bulgaria to
implement a tight limit on the amounts of newly issued and outstanding obligations under state
guarantees.  Ideally,  this  limit would  fully reflect  government  budgetary  constraints.  For
example, assuming a 30-percent default risk, the government would immediately set aside 30
percent  of  face  value  of  new  guaranteed obligations  to  build  its  contingency reserve fund
possibly within he Fiscal Reserve Account.  This fund would maintain reserves across fiscal
years  (rather than being a simple budget allocation that disappears unless  utilized in a  given
fiscal year).  Ceilings, reserve requirements, and an imperative to prioritize should apply to all
sources of explicitly guaranteed debt, encompassing obligations of all agencies, including Export
33Insurance Agency, Business Promotion Bank and State Fund for Agriculture, that are backed by
the government.
Analyze and regularly report fiscal risks. Require that analysis of fiscal risks be added to
government fiscal reports.  Regular reports should show debt scenarios (ideally in net present,
mark-to-market value as well as on annual, cash basis), discuss the potential future fiscal impact
of contingent liabilities and tax exemptions.  These reports would form a basis for reassessing
government borrowing and risk management strategies.
Priorities  for  the medium term
Close loopholes, require due diligence, monitor all sources of fiscal  risk, and prepare
contingency plans.  Legal status and regulatory framework applying to public sector institutions,
municipalities, and agencies, backed by the state, need to  cover all possible  sources of their
financial risk to be effective in preventing possible spill-over on the central government.  For
example, the budget law should close any remaining loophole allowing the municipalities to
issue guarantees and take on other contingent obligations, such as municipal insurance programs
or  issuing  municipal  bonds  outside  the  overall  limits  on  indebtedness  and  guarantees.
Furthermore, all programs and agencies explicitly or implicitly associated with the state, should
be subjected to tight reporting requirements and supervision.  Supervision as well as their design
and legal status need to ensure that their performance (including maintenance and investment)
and financial management will not create fiscal pressure on the govenmment  in the future.  To
enhance its monitoring, the government should include all sources of possible obligations in its
registers of contingent liabilities.  While implicit contingent obligations rmay  remain confidential,
the  government  needs  to  understand  their  size  and  determinants  and  prepare  adequate
contingency plans for how to face possible pressures in advance. 23
In the Public Investment Program, incorporate investments associated with EU accession
and reflect on the recurrent cost of all proposed investments.  Bringing all investments into the
Investment Program and.incorporating  recurrent cost into investment decisions is crucial to  a
good fiscal performance in  the future.  Eventually, a  medium-term fiscal framework should
replace the Public Investment Program and ensure that future investrment and recurrent costs
correctly show in the medium-term fiscal planning.
Designate risk management responsibilities and build risk management capacities.  To
optimize government liability portfolio so that it is consistent with government risk management
objectives, to design programs of contingent support (such as guarantee contracts) in a way to
minimize  moral  hazard  in  the  markets  and  future  fiscal  cost,  to  assess  adequate  reserve
requirements  so  that  they  provide  the  needed  cushion  but  without  entailing  unnecessary
opportunity cost, and to benefit from sophisticated hedging instruments and derivative markets,
the government needs to  clearly outline risk management responsibilities of  its agencies and
support their capacity building.  This is not an easy task but experience of countries like Ireland,
23  For background  on how  to deal with  implicit  contingent  liabilities  see Schick, 1999,  Polackova,  1998,  and,
with  respect  to the financial  sector,  Honohan,  1999.
34the Netherlands and Sweden offers useful lessons. Meanwhile, new risk-hedging products of the
World Bank allow Bulgaria to  reduce risk exposure, particularly the government's  significant
exposure to interest rate risk, with minimal counterpart risk, and to gain needed experience in
using more complex derivative instruments.
2. A betterframeworkforfiscal  management
In  this  section,  we  outline  a  possible  development  of  the  overall  public  finance
institutional framework in  Bulgaria  to  better  capture fiscal  risks.  This  framework aims at
promoting government fiscal performance across all types of government fiscal activities and
with respect to all sources of fiscal risks as well as to the budget.  One of the specific goals for
the new framework is to promote risk-awareness culture in government.  Below, we summarize
the key features of the new institutional framework. 24
Monitor and report.  Statements of contingent liabilities, tax expenditures and other fiscal
risks  should  list  the  various  sources  of  fiscal  risk,  discuss  their  nature  and  sensitivities,
implications on future fiscal position and equity, and where applicable provide their face and/or
estimated value. 25 Good practice is offered by Australia, Canada, Colombia, Netherlands, New
Zealand, and the  United  States.  Budget  documents of  these countries  stress-test  the  fiscal
baseline  with  respect to  major  macroeconomic, policy  and  demographic risks.  Since risk
exposures  change  with  time,  as  underlying  conditions  evolve,  government  should  reassess
assumptions that underlie its risk analysis several times a year and adjust its reserves.
To prevent spill-over of risks held by various agencies, such as subnational governments
and other public  entities, state-guaranteed funds, state-owned enterprises, and  large financial
institutions and banks, it is critical for the government to enforce transparency in the markets.  In
addition, government needs capacity to monitor and analyze its risk exposure vis-a-vis these
implicit sources of fiscal risk.  As a part of monitoring its risk exposures, government more than
risk managers in the private  sector needs to  monitor behavioral determinants of fiscal risks.
These include  performance (moral  hazard) under  its  guarantee contracts, legality  of  claims
against tax duties, and performance of subnational governments or other entities that may affect
future government fiscal position.
Adjust medium-term fiscal  strategy to risks.  Governnent medium-term fiscal strategy is
hardly viable if it does not reflect implications of fiscal risks.  The best way to show medium-
term implications of fiscal risks for the overall fiscal position, is to develop baseline medium-
term cash projections and stress-test these projections with respect to specific determinants risks
(ideally, taking into account any existing correlations).  Results of stress-testing will be critical
24  For  a more comprehensive list of measures and questions associated with the management of fiscal risks, see
Annex 3.
25  Since no cash is spent from the budget when governments assumes a contingent obligation or provides a tax
exemption, cash-based accounting systems fail to detect such fiscal risks.  But a full accrual-based accounting
system is neither necessary  nor  sufficient as  a  remedy.  International accounting standards,  for  instance,
require onlyprobable  contingent liabilities (contingencies with relatively high probability of realization) to be
included in the balance sheet, leaving the others in a separate statement of contingent liabilities.
35for govemment to re-estimate periodically the sensitivities of its risk exposure with respect to
changes  in  the  underlying  assumptions  and  to  decide  on  reserve  and  hedging  strategies
accordingly.  For  implicit  risks,  medium-term  fiscal  strategy  should  be  accompanied  by
confidential contingency plans on how to proceed when implicit and indirect risks materialize.
Similarly, equity and efficiency considerations are relevant only if they address the whole
range  of fiscal activities  and  their  future likely  costs.  The  budget law  should  require that
guarantees and other promises of contingent government support be subject to the same scrutiny
as budgetary programs.
Create accountabilityfor  risk analysis and management.  To ensure that policy makers
adequately reflect fiscal  risks in  their  fiscal plans,  they  must  become  accountable  for their
analysis and  assumptions.  Therefore,  supreme audit institutions  and  budget reports  should
comment on, and evaluate ex post, government risk analysis and risk management.
Share risk.  To create proper incentives for the borrower, lender, and program manager
under programs of government contingent support, the budget law should demand a significant
amount of risk to be shared by these parties.  The budget law may advise that state guarantees
will not cover either the full credit/obligations or risks that are under control of the borrower and
lender, such as specific commercial risks.
Make provisions and account for fiscal  risk  Budgeting and provisioning for fiscal risk
has three  main  objectives:  First,  draw more  attention to  risk  analysis,  and  thus  build risk
awareness of policy makers and the public.  In this context, the process of risk analysis is often
more important than the actual end estimate of government risk exposure.  Second, make policy-
makers  cash  neutral,  that  is  neutral  between  .,c_  `.<  I",  X
alternative  forms  of  providing  government  3  PrivateSector Logic  onPovisioning
support  from  the  viewpoint  of  deficit  The private sector offer examples,  why  to, i
measurement  and  sectoral  budgetary  envelopes.  ;F  p  ily  for the expeted  cost of contingent
ff suport  immanediately  in the  year the program isR
Third,  particularly  important  for  governments  issu  Prams  of contingent  support can bd
with  a  limited  access to  debt markets, create  a  often shown  as a put  option  twritten  (given)  by the  IV
buffer  for the event  that risks materialize.  goveent.  In  tie  private  sector,  financial-
institutonchatges  Yfull  option price when  writing
X(seIltng)  anoiA£ion.  Price of aln  option reflects the
Allen Schick, 1999 has summarized  the  present  value  of the future  possible  loss,  which'g
contemporary  approaches  to  meet  the  above  may be  incurred by the underwriting institution.M,
objectives  in the following  principles 26:  As illustrated  by the Black-Scholes  formula,  theg
.rtce  increases0:V  with  the  time  to  expiry  (egJ..
Apply joint  ceiling for the cost of budgetary  gmaturtt  of  the  guaranteed  loan) and  with  theR;,R
and  off-budget support  for each  sector  in  a  olatility  of the unerlying  asset  (eg., share  price  -
fiscal year.  Off-budget support is a form of  the enterprise  the debt  of which  is under  the
subsidy, which should be considered along  r  ).  Financial  institutions  charge  the full  . susi,ton  price  immediately  at time of selling  the^
>don.  The)  amount Xis:  then!  used either to buildlN
___eerves  or  to buy  a hedge.  See  Hull, 1997.
26  For suggestions in a country-context see Brixi, Ghanem and Islam, 1999, Mody 1999, and Brixi, Papp and
Schick, 1999.
36other forms of government support for each sector.
*  Calculate the cost of off-budget support as the present value of the future expected fiscal
cost.
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*  Reflect the cost of off-budget support in full in the year when it is issued (see box 3).
*  Transfer an amount equal to the cost of off-budget support from the budgetary envelope of
the related sector to a central contingency reserve fund.
These principles pull the expected fiscal cost of off-budget support into deficit accounting
in the year when the programs are launched.  The amount transferred to the reserve fund is
accounted for like an expense.  On the other hand, when contingent claims are paid out from the
reserve fund, fiscal deficit remains unaffected.  Implementation of the Federal Credit Reform Act
in the US has confirmed that this approach is plausible even when accounting and budgeting
systems are not fully on an accrual basis.
Utilize asset liability management strategy to neuter fiscal risks.  An integrated approach
government  assets  and  liabilities  (particularly  to  borrowing,  debt  management  and  to  the
management  of reserves)  allows to  find  natural hedges  to  fiscal  risks and  thus reduces the
contingency reserve requirement and the need of derivative instruments.  Particularly if facing
constraints in the choice of available risk management tools, the government needs to decide on
its  new borrowing and  on  rebalancing the portfolio of  outstanding liabilities in  the  context
broader challenges posed by the structure of its assets, future revenue streams, and contingent
and implicit liabilities.
Assign risk management functions and build capacities. For risk management as well as
for  conventional  budget  management,  control  structures  and  accountability  are  crucial.
Important  features  to  improve  control  and  reduce  scope  for  fraud  and  corruption  include
centralization of risk-taking authority and division of risk management responsibilities (see box
4).  For government risk management, crucial authority and responsibilities are likely to be best
placed  at the Ministry  of Finance, particularly in its departments managing debt and budget.
Their functions, as well as government risk management strategy should, however, reflect the
level of their financial and risk management capacities.  And country experience has indicated
that a lot of attention (including, for instance, aggressive hiring approaches and independent,
market-based salary scales) is needed to develop and retain such capacities in the public sector.
27  There  may be a discount  applied  on a newly  proposed  policy  (say drought  insurance)  if its risks  are negatively
correlated  with the risks of other policies (say, minimum  agricultural  price guarantee  and flood insurance).
This is because  in such a case  the newly  proposed  policy  would  increase  government  overall  risk exposure  by
less  than its full expected  cost.
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arge banks, including JP Mrga  and Deutsche Bank, have divided the functions of designing and authorizing newl
transactions, anatysis, and record keeping among three different offices.  0The  front ofrice centrwizes designing of
nancial instrumernts  and has the exclusive authority  to enter into new derivative  and debt transactions. Its objective isZ.
4 to  ensure required levels of available cash and opfimize  overall return-risk ratio.  Middle-office provides tanalysis  ofl
llfaiurc obligations  and  payoffs, anid  their sensitivities for the entire portfolio.  Finally, back-office is responsible for
,5ecord keeping and maintaining  compprehensive  databases.
11lMaintaining  these functions independent of each other improves transparency and control of portfolio risks, and itd
Uprevents  the front office from exceeding  their  predetermined  risk exposure limits.
1Governments  of Ireland and Sweden,  among others, have successfully  applied such division of responsibilities  in theirg
debt  managemnent.  :Manygoverm  ents.have  successfully ceralized  the  authority to issue debt, guarantees. tax  W
~exemptions,  andX  other of-udget  programs. FuYrther,  they should  now iexpand  the scope of risk management  and  ad
or  iionalstruct  aresndrespo:nsbs  accormgyt.  See  ars,1997.;  See Nars, 1957
IV. Conclusions
Bulgaria's current fiscal position is strong.  The CBA has been effective in imposing fiscal
discipline, but it leaves limited room for accommodating potential risks. Significant pressures
could  arise from  increases  in  international interest rates,  from  environmental  liabilities  and
investment requirements, and from failure to strengthen the collection capacities of the social
protection institutions and to establish adequate fiscal risk monitoring. Our analysis demonstrates
the  importance  of  limiting  future  exposure  of  the  government  of  Bulgaria  to  risks  while
accommodating investment needs, crucial to growth and development. For this, Bulgaria needs
to find an optimal mix of debt management, fiscal reserves and risk mitigation strategies.
Specifically, there  are several steps  for the  government to  follow  in  dealing  with  the
existing risks and  to  constrain the scope for  further accumulation of risks.  In this  context,
priorities include mitigating currency and interest-rate risks in the government liability structure,
implementing of the  envisaged institutional  and financing reforms of the pension and  health
systems,  building  adequate  contingency  reserves,  introducing  risk-sharing  arrangements,
prioritizing  and  placing  strict  limits  on  the  amounts  of  new  guaranteed  obligations,  and
developing government capacities to analyze and manage risk.  Fiscal risks should become fully
integrated with government policy considerations, in the process of fiscal management, and in an
integrated asset and liability management strategy.
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40Annex 1
Table on Bulgaria General Government, 1994-2002
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002
Projl
1
ProjIl  Projlf  Proji
1
(In percent of GDP)
Revenues  36.1  32.6  31.7  36.8  38.0  38.0  38.1  38.3
O/w  Tax revenues  29.3  26.5  26.7  31.4  31.5  31.7  31.9  32.0
O/w  VAT taxes  6.7  6.7  8.5  8.5  8.6  8.6  8.8
Social insurance contributions  7.9  6.9  6.9  7.7  8.7  8.7  8.7  8.7
Nontax revenues  5.7  4.9  4.4  5.3  6.4  6.3  6.3  6.3
Expenditures  42.4  45.2  34.2  35.8  39.5  39.4  38.4  38.9
Non-interest expenditures  27.8  24.9  25.8  31.4  34.6  34.7  34.5  34.4
O/w Compensation  4.6  3.5  3.7  4.7  5.5  5.5  5.6  5.6
Subsidies  1.1  0.8  0.7  2.0  1.2  0.8  0.5  0.4
Maintenance/operating  5.5  4.9  6.3  5.7  5.4  5.4  5.3  5.2
Social expenditures  10.8  9.1  8.5  10.9  12.7  13.5  13.5  13.4
O/w Pension  8.0  7.0  6.3  8.3  8.1  7.9  7.6  7.3
Capital expenditures  1.1  0.7  1.0  2.8  3.4  3.5  3.6  3.6
Primary balance  8.3  7.7  5.9  5.4  3.4  3.2  3.6  3.8
(Excluding costs of structural reform)  8.3  7.7  6.2  5.2  4.3  4.4  4.4  4.4
Interest  14.6  20.3  8.4  4.4  4.9  4.7  4.4  4.4
External  3.3  3.4  3.0  3.2  3.6  3.4  3.1  3.1
Domestic  11.3  17.0  5.5  1.2  1.3  1.3  1.4  1.3
Overall balance  -6.3  -12.7  -2.5  0.9  -1.5  -1.5  -0.8  -0.6
(Excluding costs of structural reform)2/  -6.3  -12.7  -2.2  0.8  -0.5  -0.3  -0.1  0.0
Financing  6.3  12.7  2.5  -0.9  0.9  1.5  0.8  0.6
External(net)  -0.9  -2.4  -1.3  -1.0  -0.7  0.4  -0.4  -1.2
Domestic(net, include IMF)  7.0  14.9  0.5  -1.5  -1.0  0.0  0.0  0.9
Privatization  0.0  0.0  3.3  1.6  2.6  1.3  1.2  1.0
Memorandum item:
Nominal GDP (in old lev bn)  880.3  1748.7  17055  21577  22010  23472  25216  27271
Fiscal Reserve Account (% ofGDP)  0.0  0.0  7.8  9.2  11.1  11.8  10.1  7.0
Sources: Ministry of Finance, and IMF
staff projection
Notes: I/ Including the activities of the State fund for Reconstruction and Development (SFRD) and the Energy Resource Fund
(ERF) which were closed with the approval of the 1999 budget.
2/ From 2000, costs of structural reform include projected additional costs of social security reforms.
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Table 1: State Guaranteed Credits, By Creditor, December 31, 1998
million  USD  Negotiated  Disbursed  Amount
amount  amount  Outstanding
Official creditors
European Investment Bank  386.7  202.6  192.6
World Bank  304.5  154.0  144.8
The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund  182.7  2.7  2.7
EBRD  172.0  127.3  103.4
K F Arab Economic Development  40.1  0.0  0.0
USA government  15.0  14.9  14.9
Total official creditors  1,100.9  501.4  458.4
Private creditors
Siemens  52.3  0.0  0.0
Nichimen Co  6.4  6.4  4.8
Total private creditors  58.7  6.4  4.8
Total  1,159.6  507.7  463.2
42Table 2: State Guaranteed Credits by Borrower, December 31, 1998
Million  USD  Negotiated  Disbursed  Amount
Million USD  amount  amount  Outstanding
Public borrowers
MRDPW-Transit  roads  161.5  59.2  57.1
Bulgarian  Telecommunication  Co  133.2  130.1  114.8
Port-Bourgas  117.0  0.0  0.0
Sofia  Airport  101.5  0.0  0.0
Bulgaria  - energy  93.0  43.0  36.9
Railway  rehabilitation  91.7  57.3  57.3
Air  traffic control  67.4  46.9  46.9
NEC  63.8  42.4  33.9
Water companies  restructuring  53.6  11.6  11.6
Ministry  of Health  52.3  0.0  0.0
Bulgarian  State Railways  45.0  26.6  26.6
NRA - project  transit roads  43.0  43.0  33.6
Social insurance  administration  22.5  1.4  1.4
Ministry  of Agriculture  15.0  14.9  14.9
MA (project  wholesales  markets)  6.7  1.9  1.9
Bulgarian  National  Television  1.0  1.0  0.3
Total public  borrowers  1,068.2  479.4  437.3
Table 3: State Guaranteed Credits, by Borrower, as of December 31, 1998
(continued)
million USD  Negotiated  Disbursed  Amount
amount  amount  Outstanding
Private  borrowers
KCM,  S.A.  48.7  1.8  1.8
Eliseina,  LTD  17.0  0.8  0.8
Private  investment  and Export  14.1  14.1  13.2
VMZ-SOPOT  6.4  6.4  4.8
Banks  - Mediators  APEX  5.2  5.2  5.2
Total private  borrowers  91.4  28.3  25.9
Total (public  & Private)  1,159.6  507.7  463.2
Notes to Tables  2 and 3:
I/ Data  is in accordance  with the Bulgarian  National  Bank  (BNB)  register  of government  and publicly  guaranteed  debts  based  on
official  MoF  information  on ratification  of NA credit  agreements  and on official  MoF information  on credit  servicing.
2/ USD  equivalent  is based  on central  exchange  rates  of the relevant  currencies  against  BGN quoted  by the BNB  on 5 July 1999
3/ 16,370.64  activated  state guarantee  on APEX loan. Interest is paid by sources of MoF. Data is submitted by BNB
International  Relations  Directorate.
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How to Build Risk Management System for a Government?
What are the key principles for government to manage its fiscal risks?  Experience in
both the public and private sector suggests that following two tasks are critical for governments
to ensure future fiscal stability and allocative efficiency in the use of future as well as present
public  finances.  First,  understand the  government risk  exposure  and  build risk  awareness.
Second,  enforce  accountability  for  dealing  with  risks.  Below  we  summarize  the  specific
questions that policy makers will need to ask to bring government fiscal performance fully under
their control. Further research is needed to elaborate on some of the recommendations below.
Questions to ask with respect to the already existing  fiscal risks:
*  What are all sources of fiscal risks?
*  What are the  sources of future possible  increases in  governmerit obligations  (direct and
contingent, explicit and implicit liabilities)?
*  What are the sources of future possible reductions in the value of government assets and
revenues (explicit and implicit risks to assets and revenues)?
*  What are the types of these risks (applying the Fiscal Risk Matrixes)?
*  What are the limits of government responsibilities for implicit liabilities and for conditions of
sudden revenue and asset shortfalls?
*  How sensitive are the risks to their underlying variables?
*  What is their expected fiscal cost and value at risk (e.g., applying stress-testing)?
*  To which risks is the government over-exposed?
*  To reduce over-exposure, is it possible to redesign government obligations, and asset and
revenue policies, and to reorient its role?
*  How to make the Fiscal Risk Matrixes public and benefit from transparency? Which implicit
liabilities, if any, should remain undisclosed and why?
*  Should the government build reserve funds or use hedging instruments to deal with possible
future obligation increases and revenue and asset shortfalls?
*  How  to  hedge  the  government's  overall  risk  exposure  that  is  emerging  from  its  entire
portfolio of fiscal risks?  Less optimally, how to hedge specific risks?
*  If hedging is not an option or not sufficient to offset government risk exposure, how large
reserves  should  be  with  respect to  future possible?  Should  the  government  purchase
insurance or re-insurance instead?
Steps to build a new risk management system:
*  Seek to ensure that government has the cash available to meet its obligations and deliver.
44*  Establish analytical framework for government to regularly analyze its fiscal risks, including
the  future  possible  increases  of  government  obligations  and  shortfalls  in  government
revenues and assets. Regularly update the Fiscal Risk Matrixes in the budget process.
*  Seek private sector solution to any request for government support to avoid risk exposure.
*  Analyze expected and maximum likely fiscal cost of obligations and expected reductions in
future revenue and asset values prior to making any policy decision.
*  Design government support, revenue and asset policies so to achieve the policy objectives
with minimum government risk exposure and without inducing moral hazard in the markets.
*  Outline a strict policy for hedging government fiscal risks (future obligation increases and
asset-revenue shortfalls) according to the government risk management capacities.  Require
hedging decisions done in the context of the entire portfolio of all fiscal risks.  Regulate the
possible use of risk-offsetting bonds and financial derivatives.  Discourage dynamic hedging
strategies.
*  Outline reserve policy with respect to fiscal risks on both liability and asset-revenue fronts
according to  the  government ability to  absorb shocks.  Determine government ability to
absorb realization of fiscal risks according to its market access to borrowing (the depth of
governnent  securities  market).  In  reserve  policy,  specify requirements  on  the  reserve
amounts  (proportionately  to  government  risk  exposure),  management  (investment  of
reserves), and on the use of reserves (only to cover the realization of risks that have been
identified ex  ante).  Consider new possible  institutional  approaches of  contract-based or
market-value based reserve management.
*  Outline principles for  government to  purchase possible  insurance and re-insurance under
competitive terms.
*  Establish  a  medium-term  fiscal  framework  to  optimize  government  management  of
expenditures, obligations, revenues and assets.
*  In fiscal reports, require a statement of contingent liabilities, tax expenditures and other fiscal
risks.
*  Reflect on future possible realization of existing fiscal risks in the medium-term fiscal cash
projection scenarios and medium-term fiscal strategy.
*  Before designing new government support, revenue or asset policy, consider what is and how
to  limit  government risk  exposure.  For support  (budget, contingent  liabilities, and  tax
expenditures), evaluate the fit with government priorities.  Minimize and announce clearly
the limits of government responsibilities to reduce moral hazard.  Require public-private risk
sharing.
*  Make provisions for fiscal risks already in the year when the government takes on the risk by
transferring the expected fiscal cost  from the budget allocation  of the related  sector to a
reserve fund (or to cover the cost of hedging and/or re-insurance).
*  In execution, stick to the present limits of government support.  Before fulfilling an implicit
obligation, assess the impact on moral hazard in the markets.
*  Monitor fiscal risks, their sensitivities, and expected and maximum likely fiscal costs.
*  Monitor reserve adequacy.
*  Monitor hedging strategies.
*  Ensure sufficient transparency and controls in government risk management.
45*  Involve the state audit in assessing the quality of government risk analysis, reserve adequacy,
risk management, and execution of risks that have realized.
*  Explain publicly any departures from originally envisaged realizalion of fiscal risks as well
as from the originally envisaged budget.
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